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 ABSTRACT 
State level milk supply and demand are modeled on a monthly basis to 
examine expected payments, government loss ratios, and economic welfare 
implications of margin insurance programs, both with and without supply controls, in 
the U.S. dairy industry. A technique is developed to properly calibrate a spatial 
econometric supply and demand system utilizing instrumental variables to model 
correlated input and output prices at both the state and national levels. Supply controls 
are found to improve producer surplus at the expense of consumer surplus and overall 
economic welfare, in expectation costing the U.S. economy an estimated $105 million 
per month. Rather than interfering with supply in the market, margin insurance 
program savings could more efficiently be generated by increasing premiums. Adverse 
selection can be more properly managed by basing premiums on market expectations 
and current conditions, as opposed to codifying premium levels for the life of the 
program in the legislation. 
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
Dustin Baker was born October 5, 1989 in Alma, Michigan. He graduated from 
St. Louis High School in May 2008. Dustin grew up on a small sheep and cattle farm 
in mid-Michigan and was extensively involved in 4-H, FFA, and athletic teams 
throughout his childhood. After beginning his college career as an animal science 
major, Dustin was granted the degree of Bachelor of Science in agribusiness 
management with a specialization in political economy from Michigan State 
University in 2012.  
 In his free time, Dustin enjoys traveling, playing sports, agricultural policy, 
youth mentoring, skiing, and supporting his beloved Michigan State Spartan athletic 
teams. Dustin will earn his Master of Science in Applied Economics and Management 
from Cornell University in May 2014. After graduation, Dustin plans to move to 
Washington, D.C. to begin a career in agricultural policy.
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my father, who always challenged me to make my mark. I love and miss you, so 
very much.  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This thesis is the culmination of the efforts of many individuals, and I could 
not possibly provide the type of recognition everyone deserves, but I will try my best. 
I would not be where I am today if it were not for the all-star supporting cast I have 
the privilege to claim in my personal and professional circles, and I am deeply 
indebted to them all for the support and guidance they have offered.  
I would like to begin my thanking my family for being there every step of the 
way since I moved to Ithaca. From phone calls with my inquisitive grandparents to 
chats with my sister about Michigan State athletics, they helped me stay grounded and 
provided the motivation needed to push through the research process. In the months 
leading up to my beginning at Cornell, my family underwent a tremendous amount of 
adversity, but through my mother’s leadership, love, and support, we have come out 
closer than ever. I owe so very much to her, and I draw strength from her 
unconditional love.  
In addition, I have been blessed by a tremendous set of friends who have been 
with me every step of the way. These cheerleaders have stuck with me and taught me 
the importance of surrounding yourself with individuals who make you a better person 
and were always willing to pick up the phone to chat after a bad day or congratulate 
my successes. My buddies from my undergraduate career at Michigan State in 
particular are of far better quality than I deserve, and I am forever indebted to their 
friendship and camaraderie.    
Of course, none of this research would have been possible if it were not for the 
guidance and instruction provided by my advisor. I thank my committee chairman, Dr. 
Joshua Woodard, for his understanding, insight, but most importantly his patience 
with me as I trudged along through the research process. I appreciate Dr. Woodard’s 
willingness to take me under his guidance to approach a hotly-debated issue and apply 
 vi 
novel techniques and modeling frameworks to achieve interesting and meaningful 
results. His creativity and ability to approach questions from new angles was vital to 
this research, and I believe this sort of cross-disciplinary approach will continue to be 
vital in my professional career.  
 My committee members including Dr. Marin Bozic and Dr. Andrew 
Novakovic provided a tremendous amount of insight into the dairy industry and 
expertise when it came to analyzing dairy markets. Their diverse backgrounds and 
thorough understanding of the policies at hand helped ensure accuracy in modeling 
and credibility to results.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Wayne Knoblauch for providing wisdom on 
farm management and life in general, as well as the chats we enjoyed surrounding out 
alma mater’s athletic teams. I have no doubt the lessons learned both in his classroom 
and through our interactions will remain useful throughout my personal and 
professional lifetime.  
The help provided by Linda Sanderson helped guide me through all the forms 
and processes required to successfully complete a graduate degree at Cornell 
University also must be noted. The emails and reminders helped ensure I was where I 
needed to be and proper forms were filled out at all times, or at least the majority of 
the time. Her work behind the scenes does not go unnoticed and is appreciated by 
everyone in the department.    
My time at Cornell University was made possible in part due to the financial 
contributions of from the Robert Smith Fund for Teaching Excellence. The generosity 
is very much appreciated I am very thankful for its contributions to my education. 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………...ix 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………..x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………...1 
 Statement of the Problem………………………………………………………1 
 Organization of Thesis…………………………………………………………6 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW………………………………….8 
 Overview of the U.S. Dairy Industry…………………………………………..8 
 Current Policy………………………………………………………………...17 
 Dairy Producer Margin Protection Program………………………………….20 
 Dairy Market Stabilization Program………………………………………….25 
 2014 Farm Bill Dairy Title……………………………………………………27 
 Literature Review……………………………………………………………..29 
CHAPTER 3: DATA…………………………………………………………………33 
 Description of Data…………………………………………………………...33 
CHAPTER 4: METHODS AND MODELS………………………………………….42 
 Replication of Previous Models………………………………………………42 
 Fixed versus Random Effects………………………………………………...45 
 Instrumental Variables. ………………………………………………………47 
 Arellano-Bond Estimator……………………………………………………..52 
 Spatial Dependence…………………………………………………………...54 
 Spatial Autoregressive Model with Instrumented Variables ………………...58 
 Monthly Milk Demand ………………………………………………………61 
CHAPTER 5: MODEL COMPARISONS…………………………………………...68 
 Supply Models………………………………………………………………..68 
 National Monthly Supply Models……………………………………………68 
 viii 
 State Annual Supply Models………………………………………………….71 
 National Annual Supply Models……………………………………………...72 
CHAPTER 6: SIMULATIONS………………………………………………………74 
 Solving the System……………………………………………………………74 
 Calibrating Coefficients ……………………………………………...………78 
 Calibrating System Standard Deviations……………………………………..81 
 Simulating Runs………………………………………………………………83 
 Simulation Considerations……………………………………………………84 
CHAPTER 7: RESULTS……………………………………………………………..87 
 Impact of Supply Controls……………………………………………………87 
 Expected Indemnities and Government Loss Ratios…………………………92 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………………….101 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. U.S. Total Milk Cow Herd Size, 1950-2012…...……………………………9 
Figure 2. U.S. Dairy Operations with Milk Cows, 1965-2012……………………….10 
Figure 3. U.S. Dairy Cow Productivity, 1950-2012……………………………….....11 
Figure 4. U.S. Milk Output, 1950-2012………………………………………………12 
Figure 5. Purchased Feed as Percentage of Total Feed Costs, 2012…………….…....15 
Figure 6.  Average Cow Herd Size by State, 2012…………………………….……..16 
Figure 7. U.S. Monthly Milk Income over Feed Cost Margin, 2000-2012….…….....24 
Figure 8. Expected Annual Government Loss Ratios, Small Farms…………………99 
Figure 9. Expected Annual Government Loss Ratios, Large Farms…………….….100 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Emergence of Western Milk Production…………………………………....13 
Table 2. DFA and DSA Administrative Fees………………………………………...22 
Table 3. DFA and DSA DPMPP Premium Rates…………………………………….23 
Table 4. 2014 Farm Bill DPMPP Premium Rates……………………………………28 
Table 5. Monthly State Level Supply Shifter Summary Statistics…………………...35 
Table 6. Monthly State Level Demand Shifter Summary Statistics………………….38 
Table 7. State Annual Level Supply Shifter Summary Statistics…………………….39 
Table 8. Monthly National Level Summary Statistics………………………………..40 
Table 9. Annual National Level Summary Statistics ……….………………………..40 
Table 10. AMS 2007 Replication, Annual Milk Production by State………………..44 
Table 11. State Monthly OLS Parameter Estimates………………………………….46 
Table 12. Hausman Test Results……………………………………………………...46 
Table 13. Monthly State 2SLS Parameter Estimates…………………………………50 
Table 14. Monthly State 2SLS Stage 1 Results………………………………………51 
Table 15. Monthly State 2SLS Underidentification Test…………………………….51 
Table 16. Monthly State 2SLS Sargan Test………………………………………….52 
Table 17. Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimator Parameters …………….53 
Table 18. Monthly State SAR Parameter Estimates………………………………….57 
Table 19. Monthly State Spatial Tests………………………………………………..57 
Table 20. Monthly State SAR Panel Model with IVs………………………………..58 
Table 21. Monthly State SAR 1st Stage Results……………………………………...60 
Table 22. Monthly State SAR Underidentification Test……………………………..61 
Table 23. Monthly State SAR Sargan Test…………………………………………...61 
Table 24. Monthly State OLS Demand Parameter Estimates………………………...63 
Table 25.  Monthly State 2SLS Demand Parameter Estimates…………………….…63 
 xi 
Table 26. Monthly State 2SLS 1st Stage Parameter Estimates……………………….64 
Table 27. Monthly State 2SLS Demand Underidentification Test…………………...64 
Table 28. Monthly State 2SLS Demand Sargan Test………………………………...65 
Table 29. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Parameter Estimates…………………….65 
Table 30. Monthly State Demand SAR IV 1st Stage Parameter Estimates...…………66 
Table 31. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Underidentification Test………………...66 
Table 32. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Sargan Test……………………………...67 
Table 33. Monthly National Level Supply Parameter Estimates……………………..70 
Table 34. Annual State Level Supply Parameter Estimates…………………………..72 
Table 35.  Annual National Level Supply Parameter Estimates……………………...73 
Table 36. Welfare Analysis-Simulation Results (Monthly Expected Values)………..89 
Table 37. Expected State Level Monthly Milk Price ($/cwt.)………………………..90 
Table 38. Expected State Level Monthly Milk Production (lbs.)…………………….91 
Table 39. Expected Annual National Margin Shortfalls ($/cwt./year)……………….92 
Table 40. DFA Expected Government Loss Ratios…………………………………..93 
Table 41.  DSA with Constant Volatility Expected Government Loss Ratios……….94 
Table 42. DSA Expected Government Loss Ratios…………………………………..95 
Table 43. 2014 Farm Bill Expected Government Loss Ratios……………………….95 
Table 44. Expected Government Loss Ratios, Small Farms ………………………...96 
Table 45. Expected Government Loss Ratios, Large Farms…………………………97 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
 Beginning in the 1990s, farm level milk prices began to exhibit levels of severe 
volatility that had not been seen since the introduction of federal price supports in the 
1940s (Nicholson and Fiddaman, 2003). Corn and other feed prices increased rapidly 
starting in 2007, in conjunction with federal incentives to blend ethanol in gasoline. 
The Great Recession had demand side impacts to further depress milk prices. With 
this combination of conditions, a consensus emerged among leaders in the U.S. dairy 
industry during the 2013 Farm Bill debate that the time had come to create a federal 
dairy safety net focused on insuring milk price over feed cost margins. This stands in 
somewhat in contrast to the traditional milk price support, which primarily relied on 
milk price as the trigger. The previous Dairy Title program, the Milk Income Loss 
Contract (MILC), contained quantity based payment limits, and large farms would 
typically hit their maximum payments within the first several months of the year if the 
contract triggered, leaving them mostly exposed to milk price risk. These provisions 
left larger farms more open to price risk. Meanwhile, a debate also emerged over 
whether new programs would have supply controls implemented as well. The 
argument advanced was that the margin insurance program should be coupled with 
supply controls to depress government costs, and to assist in expediting the market to 
adjust in times of low margins. Ultimately however, supply controls were not included 
in the final version of the Agricultural Act of 2014.  
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 While some studies exist analyzing the effects of the proposed dairy margin 
insurance program, both with and without supply controls, the few studies are 
inconclusive and lack a thorough analysis of how supply controls would likely impact 
price and quantity levels, especially at the regional level. The Dairy Security Act 
(DSA), which was the dairy proposal in S. 954, utilizes supply controls in addition to 
its margin insurance program. Nicholson and Stephenson (2010) conduct a national 
level analysis with a partial supply model which assumes exogenous price discovery, 
and argue that they would result in increased average all-milk price, reduce cumulative 
milk production, and decrease government costs compared to the baseline, whereas 
other studies by Nicholson and Stephenson (2011) conclude that the average all-milk 
price would be decreased as a result of supply controls, and lead to an increase in 
production.  
 The alternative proposal in H.R. 2642 as passed by the House of 
Representatives in July 2013, known as the Dairy Freedom Act (DFA), omitted supply 
controls. These studies found that under that policy, milk production would be 
virtually unchanged. Other studies have argued that supply control measures would 
not pose long-term obstacles to growth (Brown and Madison, 2013; Newton et. al, 
2013).  
Previous studies focusing on the national effects of the proposed margin 
insurance tend to assume constant participation rates among similarly sized farms 
across the country. That is, a 500 cow dairy farmer in New York State has the same 
probability of participation and identical risk preferences to a 500 cow dairy farmer in 
Florida or Idaho. Given the composition and heterogeneity of dairy producers, as well 
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as the differences in growth trajectories across the country, this may be a questionable 
assumption. Several studies have also noted the likely disparities in the recipients of 
benefits from the newly proposed margin insurance programs and the transfer of 
benefits from innovative to stagnant producers (Balagtas, 2013; Newton, Thraen, and 
Bozic, 2013; Woodard and Baker, 2013).  
This study, to our knowledge, is the first of its kind to examine state-level price 
and quantity effects in milk markets resulting from the dairy margin insurance 
programs, both with and without supply controls, as well as the actual language in the 
Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 Farm Bill). The majority of the literature suggests 
supply controls in the margin insurance programs would have little effect on the 
market, thus they are fiscally responsible. However, existing studies ignore the likely 
possibility that there would be differing participation in different regions (Woodard 
and Baker, 2013), ignore welfare losses, and likewise do not depend upon properly 
instrumented supply and demand models. This study attempts to quantify the impact 
of supply controls in terms of welfare gains and losses, expected payments, and 
output. Presumably, supply controls, if significant enough to impact government 
expenditures, would have an effect in the milk marketplace. If this is the case, these 
effects should be able to be quantified and there should exist winners and losers as a 
result of their market distorting effects. This study attempts to put a dollar value on the 
cost of supply controls to the economy at large as a result of wealth transfers and 
deadweight losses.  
Participation in margin insurance with supply controls would be driven by 
many factors. These factors include personal ideologies, investment trends, and 
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regional price trends. Given that the proposed programs are all based on national 
prices and national feed costs, states with differing bases to national level prices will 
enjoy or suffer differing allocations of benefits as a result if participation is not 
uniform.  
A variety of econometric approaches are taken to accurately model state level 
milk supply and demand in the United States utilizing data obtained from the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), United States Census Bureau, and the 
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis. These data are collected on the monthly 
state level, annual state level, monthly national level, and annual national level for 
robustness purposes. Relevant variables are derived from previous studies on regional 
and national level supply models (Chavas, Kraus, and Jesse, 1990; FAPRI, 2004; 
AMS, 2007; Bozic, Kanter, and Gould, 2012; Weersink and Tauer, 1990). In order to 
produce a reasonable model of the actual market for dairy products in the United 
States, a state-level demand model is also estimated in order to construct estimates of 
equilibrium price and quantity impacts, building upon approaches from previous 
studies on milk demand (FAPRI, 2004; Kaiser, 2000; Schmitt and Kaiser, 2002; 
Kaiser and Dong, 2006; Kaiser, 2010; AMS, 2007).  
This study adds to the existing dairy market literature by utilizing an 
instrumental variable approach to estimate milk supply and demand. Previous 
literature suffers from poor identification because it lacks instrumentation for 
endogenous variables. When modeling a supply and demand system to achieve 
equilibrium quantities and price, it is necessary to utilize instrumental variables to 
obtain consistent and identified estimates of the model parameters. Typically, failure 
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to properly instrument for the endogeneity of prices will result in biasing of price 
elasticity coefficients toward zero.  
Furthermore, this study is the first to implement a spatial econometric 
approach to the estimation of a milk supply and demand model. By doing so, 
exogenous shocks to given states are no longer independent of one another, but rather 
reverberate throughout the system, subject to time and distance decay. This spatial 
consideration is an important component of this study, and is more reflective of real 
world price dynamics in agricultural markets. For example, consider an increase in 
feed prices in New York. This shock is likely to have an effect on overall milk 
production in Pennsylvania and Vermont because of the proximity to one another and 
the flow of goods across state lines, but the shock in New York is expected to have 
less of an effect on milk production in Arizona. The spatial network approach 
developed in this study allows for these neighborhood relationships to exist and to 
more accurately model state level markets than those that ignore the spatial structure 
of the data.  
In addition, this study is one of the first, if not the first, to develop and 
implement a properly calibrated spatial econometric supply and demand model 
anywhere in the literature. From the models estimated using the data described above, 
simulations of future price paths of relevant prices and quantities are generated. The 
aim of the study is to develop a disaggregated model of milk supply and demand to be 
extended for many other uses in the future, particularly in analyzing policy effects at 
the regional level. After acceptable and plausible supply and demand models are 
estimated, different scenarios are simulated. The supply and demand equations are 
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solved for state level milk price and quantity, which aggregate up to the national level 
milk price and quantity. The simulation is calibrated utilizing the parameters from the 
supply and demand models and information obtained from the futures and options 
markets to ensure price paths are consistent with the actual risks inherit in the 
marketplace. Cholesky decomposition and Euler methods are utilized to ensure 
sufficient correlation exists between the relevant futures contract random walk price 
paths and state level price paths implied as a result of estimating conditional 
characteristic spatial models. The explicit spatial structure and relationships are 
automatically built in between cash and futures prices at both the state and national 
levels.   
Understanding the potential economic impacts on the U.S. dairy industry in 
general and at the regional level of dairy margin insurance is important for evaluating 
the effectiveness of these programs. Expected payments are calculated and 
governmental loss ratios are also computed. Results are interpreted in terms producer 
revenue, consumer and producer surplus, price and quantity, as well as national 
welfare effects and deadweight loss to the economy at large.   
Organization of Thesis 
 Following the introduction, this thesis proceeds in the following manner. First, 
background information detailing the makeup of the U.S. dairy industry and its 
geographic differences is provided. This is necessary to develop an understanding of 
the major milk producing areas in the U.S., milk production and price trends, and the 
differences in types of farms by region. Dairy policy prior to the 2014 Farm Bill is 
then briefly described. Next, a detailed review of the two competing margin insurance 
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proposals (DFA and DSA) leading up to the 2014 Farm Bill is provided. Finally, the 
provisions of the eventual Dairy Title in the 2014 Farm Bill are described.  
Next, data utilized in developing the models are described, summarized, and 
analyzed. Replications of previous studies are attempted, but the uniqueness of the 
specific needs for this study underscore the need for a novel, new approach to 
modeling the milk markets. A walk-through of the various approaches to model the 
system is conducted, along with the associated statistical tests to validate the 
approaches used.  
Next, simulations are conducted to estimate impacts of supply controls and 
expected payment rates. Baseline scenarios are run to analyze expected indemnities, 
government loss ratios, and welfare considerations under DFA, DSA, and the actual 
provisions in the Dairy Title of the 2014 Farm Bill. The last section concludes and 
suggests areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Overview of the U.S. Dairy Industry  
The United States dairy industry is a vital component of the rural agricultural 
economy. Nationwide, the annual economic impact of the dairy industry is more than 
$100 billion (NMPF, 2007). Milk is produced in all 50 states, although the amount of 
milk produced in each state varies dramatically, with approximately 87% produced in 
the top nineteen states. With approximately 9.3 million cows, the United States is the 
worldwide leader in fluid milk production.  
The dairy industry is a dynamic, ever-changing market marked by a long 
running trend of consolidation (Shields, 2010). The total milk cow herd in the U.S. 
decreased markedly from the mid-20th Century until the early 1990s, at which point 
the rate of change decreased to the plateau where it remains today (Figure 1).  
Losses in total number of dairy farms nationwide decreased from well over 1 
million in 1965 to less than 65,000 today, which an average loss of 2000 to 5000 
farms per year in recent years. These decreases in total farm numbers can be 
visualized in Figure 2. This decrease in total farm numbers has been offset by 
increased production per cow, translating to an increasing trend in total production 
throughout this time period. These trends are displayed in Figures 3 and 4, 
respectively.  
 This is not to say states felt the squeeze of consolidation in similar manners, 
however. During this time period, certain states and regions witnessed a contraction of 
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Figure 1.U.S. Total Milk Cow Herd Size, 1950-2012, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Available online at  
http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ 
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Figure 2. U.S. Dairy Operations with Milk Cows, 1965-2012, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Cattle, Cows, Milk-
Operations with Inventory, Available online at  http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ 
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Figure 3. U.S. Dairy Cow Productivity, 1950-2012, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Milk-Production, Measured in 
lb/head, Available online at  http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ 
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Figure 4. U.S. Milk Output, 1950-2012, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Milk-Production, Measured in lb, 
Available online at  http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/
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output and dairy farm numbers, whereas others experienced unprecedented growth, 
particularly in the West. Peterson (2002) contrasts these two types of farms as 
“traditional-style dairies” and “Western-style dairies”. The traditional-style dairy 
consists of a smaller herd and relies on comparatively more land holding used for 
forage, whereas the Western-style dairy consists of a larger herd and relies more 
heavily on purchased feeds. The rapid increase in total milk production the Western 
states of the United States (highlighted in red) over the past six decades can be viewed 
in Table 1.  
Table 1. Emergence of Western Milk Production 
1960 1980 2000 2012 
State 
Production 
(Million 
lbs.) State 
Production 
(Million 
lbs.) State 
Production 
(Million 
lbs.) State 
Production 
(Million 
lbs.) 
WI 17,780 WI 22,380 CA 32,245 CA 41,801 
MN 10,272 CA 13,577 WI 23,259 WI 27,224 
NY 10,171 NY 10,974 NY 11,921 ID 13,558 
CA 8,059 MN 9,535 PA 11,156 NY 13,196 
PA 6,878 PA 8,496 MN 9,493 PA 10,493 
IA 5,940 MI 4,970 ID 7,223 TX 9,596 
MI 5,173 OH 4,310 TX 5,743 MN 9,071 
OH 5,125 IA 3,994 MI 5,705 MI 8,889 
IL 4,229 TX 3,625 WA 5,593 NM 8,149 
MO 3,685 WA 2,942 NM 5,236 WA 6,234 
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Available online at  
http://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ 
 
As a result of the discrepancies between the two types of management profiles, 
a traditional dairy must acquire more land holdings to produce its feed, whereas a 
Western-style dairy is able to focus on capital expenditures and improved technology 
while simply purchasing the additional feed required. The difference in percentage of 
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feed costs purchased among Western-style and traditional-style dairies can be viewed 
in Figure 5.  
 During the emergence of the Western states and these Western-style dairies 
onto the national milk scene, feed costs were relatively stable and predictable. As time 
progressed, particularly since the early to mid-2000s, feed cost volatility increased 
dramatically, leaving these Western-style dairies open and exposed to the risk due to 
their feed purchasing patterns. As Peterson (2002) points out, these states also happen 
to be, on average, larger in size than their Eastern and Midwestern counterparts. 
Selected states’ average milking cow herd sizes in 2012 are summarized in Figure 6.  
Because of the vast differences in herd sizes among states, it is clear that the existing 
dairy policy consisting of payment caps based on milk production, such as those found 
in the MILC program (described in next section), do not fit the production practices or 
makeup of a significant portion of the U.S. dairy industry. Simply put, it is difficult to 
create a one-size-fits-all solution for the wide array of producers in such a diverse, 
heterogeneous industry. Wolf (2003) indicates that sunk costs lead to higher 
adjustment costs for farmers in traditional areas. Emerging areas, particularly in the 
West, were able to spread initial fixed costs over more animals, and were able to 
utilize dry lot production systems and reduce asset fixity. This adoption of increases in 
technology is what allowed the Western states and the Western-style dairies to 
explode onto the scene and garner a significant amount of market share over the past 
three decades while employing larger, more productive herds as a result of technology 
and capital structure. The milk production per cow in these Western-style dairies tends 
to be much higher than those in traditional areas, as well (Miller and Blayney, 2006). 
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Figure 5. Purchased Feed as Percentage of Total Feed Costs, 2012, Economic Research Service (ERS), Milk cost of production by 
State, 2013, Available online at http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/milk-cost-of-production-estimates.aspx#.U15gY8eT57c 
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Figure 6. Average Cow Herd Size by State, 2012 National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), Milk Production, February 2013, 
Available online at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/MilkProd//2010s/2013/MilkProd-02-20-2013.pdf
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Despite the emergence of new, large players in Western states over the past 
several decades, other regions of the country are undergoing a renaissance in their own 
right. For example, the emergence of the yogurt industry in New York State is well-
documented (Novakovic and Boynton, 2014). New York has nearly doubled its yogurt 
(specifically Greek yogurt, which requires 3 times more milk to produce than regular) 
plants since 2000, and has tripled its yogurt production over the past 6 years to 
become the nation’s largest producer of the protein-rich dairy product. This increase in 
processing capacity has produced a considerable amount of momentum and pressure 
for the state’s milk production to increase in order to meet the demand, even resulting 
in Governor Cuomo’s Yogurt Summit in August 2012 to discuss strategies to meet 
these challenges. A similar resurgence of the Wisconsin dairy industry has occurred 
since the early 2000s through efforts by the state’s Dairy Business Association and 
Professional Dairy Producers of Wisconsin as herd sizes have increased and statewide 
regulations and standards have been passed in the state legislature.  
Current Policy 
Price support programs in the dairy industry have been in existence since the 
Agricultural Act of 1949, and although they have been amended many times through 
the passage of numerous farm bills, their intent has always been the same: to provide 
price and income support, provide market stability for dairy producers, and enhance 
risk management. Chief among these programs under the Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill) include the Dairy Products Price Support 
Program (DPPSP) and the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program, both of 
which rely on simple price triggers (Schnepf, 2012).  
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The DPSPP was established in 1949 and supports the farm price of fluid milk 
at $9.90 per hundredweight (cwt.) through government purchases of dairy products at 
set prices. These purchases are countercyclical. When purchases exceed statutory 
levels, USDA makes temporary adjustments to avoid accumulation of excess 
inventories. Since the mid-1990s, milk prices have trended higher than the flat support 
price, albeit coupled with greater volatility. This volatility has made it difficult for 
farmers and farm managers to plan in the future, as the low support price increases 
vulnerability to the costs of feed. Rising feed costs, arising from the emergence of the 
U.S. ethanol industry since 2006, are of particular concern to dairy producers, as they 
represent a significant portion of the cost of milk production. At its height of 
importance in the early 1980s, the DPPSP had financial outlays in of $10.592 billion 
in FY1981-FY1985, whereas outlays in FY20008-FY2012 hovered around $280 
million (Schnepf, 2012). 
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program provides farm income 
support to participating dairy farms through government payments whenever the farm 
price for fluid consumption falls below the target price for fluid milk sold to 
processors in the Boston market. MILC imposes a limit on milk marketing eligible for 
payment during any fiscal year ranging from 2.4 to 2.985 million pounds, or 
approximately the production of 100-150 cows. As a result, large-scale producers can 
quickly hit their cap in the first couple months of a calendar year. In recent years, the 
target minimum price of $16.94 per hundredweight is increased if feed prices exceed a 
base level as determined by the National Average Dairy Feed Cost, based off of 
national prices.  
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As a result of differences in dairy farm size and productivity across states, 
regional distribution of benefits can, and do, differ. Due to the cap on MILC 
payments, it is generally known and accepted that the program provides 
disproportionate benefits to states and regions with smaller-sized herds. As a result, 
many have recognized the need for more capable risk management tools for large-
scale dairy operations to utilize to protect themselves from increasingly volatile feed 
costs and milk prices. This is one of the primary inspirations for the policies which 
serve as the focus of this study, described in the next section.  MILC payment rates 
historically have been unknown until the end of the month following the month to 
which they apply, which further delays the payment process. Financial outlays for the 
MILC program totaled $1.091 billion in FY2008-FY2012 (Schnepf, 2012).   
In addition to DPPMP and MILC, there also exists the Dairy Export Incentive 
Program (DEIP), established in 1985 to subsidize dairy exports by providing per-unit 
cash payments to exporters. The program was designed to help higher priced U.S. 
dairy products compete in international markets. The program is rarely used, as the use 
of dairy export subsidies worldwide has decreased dramatically. In FY2008-FY2012, 
total outlays associated with DEIP amounted to $28 million (Schnepf, 2012). 
The Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) are geographically defined fluid 
milk demand areas. The FMMOs regulate milk marketings across state lines to 
provide both price support and market stability for dairy producers. FMMOs are 
permanently authorized and are not subject to reauthorization in farm bills. Delivery to 
FMMOs are governed by two main principles: classified pricing of milk according to 
end use, and pooling of receipts within the FMMO with a weighted average price, or 
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blend price. Nine states have their own marketing orders separate from the federal 
orders, but operate in similar manners. Within each FMMO, processors are required to 
pay a minimum price for milk based upon its intended end use, known as classified 
pricing. Fluid milk (Class I) demands the highest prices, followed by manufactured 
products such as yogurt and ice cream (Class II), cheese (Class III), and finally butter 
and powdered milk (Class IV). Component prices are determined by the wholesale 
prices of storable dairy products. The processing costs, or make allowance, is 
determined from a formula and the yield of milk components in the final products. A 
fluid milk price is calculated from these and varies by region. Finally, the value of all 
milk sales in each order is pooled together to provide a uniform average price to 
farmers delivering milk.  
These programs, coupled with smaller dairy support programs, are the main 
vehicles through which dairy producer price and income support are delivered. Other 
programs focus on promotion and disaster assistance, but are beyond the scope of this 
research. In the following paragraphs, the two competing dairy legislation proposals, 
H.R. 2642 and S. 954, or as they are more commonly known the Dairy Freedom Act 
(DFA) and the Dairy Security Act (DSA), respectively, are described in detail. The 
DSA was included in the Senate’s 2012 and 2013 Farm Bill, whereas DFA was the 
policy instrument of choice in the House’s 2013 Farm Bill. Both pieces call for the 
repeal of DPPSP, MILC, and DEIP programs and replace them with margin insurance.  
Dairy Producer Margin Protection Program 
Variability in the agricultural industry is not a new concept, but the levels in 
recent years are unprecedented. The U.S. all-milk price in May 2008 was $18.30/ 
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hundredweight; a year later, it dropped to $11.60. This type of variability, coupled 
with feed prices soaring to record levels amid the nationwide drought of 2012, led to 
call for the replacement of the dairy programs that rely on simple price triggers and 
instead focus on measures of profitability that truly matter to a producer’s viability in 
the marketplace.  
Both the House and the Senate’s dairy provisions contained the Dairy Producer 
Margin Protection Program (DPMPP). The DPMPP is an income-over-feed costs 
margin insurance program that pays the difference between the national all-milk price 
and the national average of feeding dairy animals, which is a weighted formula 
announced by USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The formula 
for the feed cost per cwt. and margin per cwt. are found below, where milk price is in 
$/cwt., corn price is $/bushel, and the soybean meal and alfalfa hay prices are in $/ton: 
 
 
The DPMPP included a fully-subsidized option in the Senate and a nearly 
fully-subsidized version in the House that pays producers when the margin between 
the bi-monthly U.S. all-milk price and a feed cost formula fall below $4.00 for 
consecutive two-month periods known as Basic Margin Protection (BMP). Once 
triggered, the BMP pays out on the minimum of 80% of the producer’s milk 
production history (the highest annual production of the past three years prior to 
implementation) or the actual milk produced in the 2 month period. BMP payments 
are equal to the following: 
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Administrative fees are based upon the previous calendar year milk marketings 
(lbs.) and are paid at registration: 
Table 2. DFA and DSA Administrative Fees 
If previous calendar year milk marketings (lbs.) are: H.R. 2642 S. 954 
   
< 1 million lbs. 
 
None  $100  
≥ 1 million lbs. but ≤ 5 million lbs. 
 
None  $250  
> 5 million lbs. but ≤ 10 million lbs. 
 
None  $350  
> 10 million lbs. but ≤ 40 million lbs. 
 
None  $1,000  
> 40 million lbs. 
    
None  $2,500  
                
Producers enrolled in the BMP also have the option to annually decide whether 
or not to participate in Supplemental Margin Protection (SMP), which allows 
producers to purchase, at fixed premium rates per cwt., additional insurance of up to 
an $8.00 margin, on their choice of 25% to 90% of the previous year’s milk 
production. The predetermined premiums vary by coverage/trigger level, as well as 
overall production per year, but are fixed for the lifetime of the Farm Bill. Again, the 
election to participate in the DPMPP is voluntary—the decision to participate in BMP 
is a one-time decision that last for the duration of the Farm Bill, whereas the SMP 
decision is made on an annual basis.  
The DFA and DSA both contain the SMP, albeit with differing producer 
premiums and coverage options. Both versions include a break in premium rates 
between the first 4 million pounds of production and production in excess of 4 million 
pounds, as can be found in Table 3. 
Table 3. DSA and DFA DPMPP Premium Rates 
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 Coverage 
Threshold 
H.R. 2642   S. 954 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production > 4 
million pounds   
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production > 4 
million pounds 
$4.00 None $0.03 
 
None None 
$4.50 $0.01 $0.045 
 
$0.01 $0.02 
$5.00 $0.02 $0.066 
 
$0.02 $0.04 
$5.50 $0.035 $0.11 
 
$0.035 $0.10 
$6.00 $0.045 $0.185 
 
$0.045 $0.15 
$6.50 $0.09 $0.29 
 
$0.09 $0.29 
$7.00 $0.18 $0.38 
 
$0.40 $0.63 
$7.50 $0.60 $0.83 
 
$0.60 $0.83 
$8.00 $0.95 $1.06 
 
$0.95 $1.06 
            
Payments under SMP are calculated by the following formula:  
 
Unlike the MILC program, the DFA and DSA do not have production caps on 
payments. Because of this, these programs are thought to appeal to those producers 
who were large enough to exhaust their MILC payments before the end of the calendar 
year, as well as those who have different cost or revenue structures than the national 
level prices used in the calculation of margins. A summarization of past national IOFC 
margins from 2000-2012 can be found in Figure 7.  
It is important to note that this margin is only a rough estimate of the nation’s
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Figure 7. U.S. Monthly Milk Income over Feed Cost Margin, 2000-2012
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dairy farmers’ prices as a whole, and omits individual heterogeneity or regional 
differences in milk and feed prices. In addition, no attempt to include other operating 
costs, such as management or labor, is included. The voluntary participation 
component presents unique challenges to predicting potential impacts of the 
legislation, and will be discussed later in this paper.  
Dairy Market Stabilization Program  
In times of low margin, it is in the collective interest of dairy producers to 
collectively reduce output to drive prices up toward more desirable levels. Because 
relying on the market to make these necessary adjustment can at times, it is believed, 
be slow and inefficient, the DSA contains the Dairy Market Stabilization Program 
(DMSP). Under DSA, producers participating in the DPMPP are required to also 
participate in the DMSP, which is a supply management-type program designed to 
enhance milk prices by reducing milk supply by imposing penalties on dairy farmers 
shipping more milk than their assigned production levels during these periods, in 
essence decreasing supply. In addition, the forfeited income as a result of 
overproduction from participating farms would be diverted to the government, at 
which point the funds would be used to purchase dairy products for school lunch 
programs, shelters, etc. These actions are thought to increase demand for dairy 
products, thus allowing the margin to recover quicker than the market would recover 
on its own.   
Each year, dairy producers have the ability to choose how their milk 
production base is determined under DMSP. The participating dairy operation can 
elect to use the volume of the average monthly milk marketings for the 3 months 
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immediately preceding the announcement by the Secretary of Agriculture that the 
stabilization is activated, or the volume of the monthly milk marketings for the same 
month in the preceding year as the month for which the program is effective. When 
the rolling 2 month average margin is below $6, producers receive payment for the 
higher of either 98% of their production base or 94% of the current month’s actual 
marketings. If the national margin is below $5 for two consecutive months, producers 
receive payment for the higher of 97% of their production base or 93% of the current 
month’s marketings. When the margin is below $4 for a single month, producers 
receive the higher of 96% of their production base or 94% of the current month’s milk 
marketing.  
The stabilization program is suspended after the margin is above $6 for two 
consecutive months, or when the U.S. cheddar cheese or nonfat dry milk price is equal 
to or higher than the world price for 2 consecutive months when the margin is less 
than $6, 5% or more above the world price for 2 consecutive months when the margin 
is less than $5, or 7% or more above the world price for 2 consecutive months when 
the margin is less than $4.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), budgetary outlays for 
the House and the Senate versions over FY2013-FY2017 are $60 million and $107 
million, respectively. By revoking existing policies in place and replacing them with 
the aforementioned bills, the projected savings are estimated at $141 million under the 
Senate plan and $181 million under the House plan. However, despite the importance 
of these types of policy interventions, the welfare implications, regional effects, 
impacts on producer behavior, and producer preferences and perceptions, although 
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analyzed in number of reports and articles, are not well understood. Because the 
programs are in their infancy and have yet to be implemented, there are a number of 
unknown factors surrounding the efficacy and reliability of each. 
Virtually all producer groups representing dairy farmers across the country support the 
DPMPP. The DMSP, on the other hand, received the lion’s share of debate and 
scrutiny surrounding the farm bill debate. In general, states that tend to have larger 
dairy cow herd sizes, feed costs, and purchased feed as a percent of total feed costs 
tended to house producer groups which favored the DMSP. In contrast, those states 
with a higher percentage of smaller herd sizes and those which grew their own feed 
tended to, on the margin, be home to producer groups which were outspoken against 
the DMSP. Similarly, food processors, manufacturers, and retailers vehemently 
opposed the supply controls included in the DMSP. This divide is better understood by 
taking a fundamental look at the roles of variable and fixed costs. Many states in the 
West, as described above, and those with Western-style production practices, have 
been exposed to episodes of very high and volatile feed (variable) costs because they 
purchase the majority of their inputs. These larger farms also have lower fixed costs 
per unit, which translates to a lower opportunity cost of idling production compared to 
their Midwestern and Eastern counterparts. For this reason, it is not surprising the 
DMSP gained publicly-stated support from the majority of the dairy producer groups 
in Western-style states.  
2014 Farm Bill Dairy Title 
The conference report for the Agricultural Act of 2014 was agreed to in the 
House and Senate in late January and early February 2014, some 6 months after H.R. 
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2642 first passed. After long and arduous debates in the conference committee over 
the dairy title, the bill was signed into law on February 7, 2014. In general, the final 
provisions contain a version of the margin protection program without supply controls. 
Limits are placed on the amount of milk that can be insured. This value is equal to the 
highest annual milk marketings by the operation during 2011-2013. Farmers can 
insure between 25-90% in 5 –percent increments of its production history in 50 cent 
intervals from $4.00 to $8.00. Annual administrative costs for participating producers 
of any size is $100. Producer premiums once again have a break at the 4 million 
pounds of production threshold and are summarized below: 
Table 4. 2014 Farm Bill DPMPP Premium Rates 
 
 Coverage Threshold 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production > 4 
million pounds 
$4.00 None None 
$4.50 $0.010 $0.020 
$5.00 $0.025 $0.040 
$5.50 $0.040 $0.100 
$6.00 $0.055 $0.155 
$6.50 $0.090 $0.290 
$7.00 $0.217 $0.830 
$7.50 $0.300 $1.060 
$8.00 $0.475 $1.360 
    It is important to note that, once again, these margins are based upon national 
level prices and the premiums do not change over the life of the bill. Despite the fact 
market conditions change throughout the lifetime of a multi-year piece of legislation, 
the premium structure is static and could allow for producers to adversely select in and 
out of different thresholds. A purpose of this research is to focus on whether or not
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these are actuarially fair and to determine government loss ratios associated with each 
coverage level.  
Literature Review 
A wide array of work has been conducted examining price volatility in the 
dairy industry as well as the effects of both DFA and DSA. Variability is accepted as 
inherent of the dairy industry, as anyone familiar with the nature of milk and feed 
price paths over the past decade can contend. The source of this volatility is perhaps 
less well understood. Nicholson and Fiddaman (2003) contend price volatility 
increased dramatically for farm milk prices after the removal of price supports as a 
central feature in dairy markets beginning in 1988. Their model suggests there are a 
large number of factors affecting price volatility, including supply and demand shocks, 
behavioral responses of various segments of the industry to price signals, cycles of 
processing capacity, and cycles of cow numbers. Ultimately, their findings suggest 
certain regulatory policies may actually unintentionally increase volatility, whereas 
price supports and trade may decrease this volatility.  
A considerable amount of research is focused on assessing legislation’s effect 
on level and variation of all-milk price, the level of IOFC, milk marketed, government 
expenditures, and net exports of dairy products. Nicholson and Stephenson (2010) 
analyze the ability of the Foundation for the Future program (which includes what is 
known today as DSA), to mitigate price volatility in the U.S. dairy industry. Dairy 
product demand was represented utilizing constant elasticity demand equations, which 
shift with income and population growth. Focusing specifically on the FFTF program, 
it was found to reduce cumulative milk production compared to the baseline, reduce 
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cumulative milk production, and reduce government costs for dairy programs. The 
program also increased average all-milk price both in the absence and presence of 
shocks. 
Nicholson and Stephenson (2011) also attempt to analyze the market impacts, 
specifically focusing on prices, price volatility, milk marketed, government 
expenditures, and exports, of the Dairy Security Act and the Dairy Provisions of the 
Rural Economic Farm and Ranch Sustainability and Hunger Act of 2011. They found 
DSA reduces variation in the U.S. all-milk price, with reductions increasing with 
increasing participation. But because the variability is reduced, the average U.S. all-
milk price is reduced. Despite the supply controls, total milk marketed per year 
actually increases. Higher coverage levels also result in larger government costs, and 
total milk marketed per year on average from 2012-2018 increases a small amount. 
Ultimately, the degree of reduced variation depends strongly on the participation 
decisions of farmers. We extend this analysis by looking at not only differing levels of 
participation of producers, but also differing levels of participation in different states.  
DSA and DFA effects on the individual farm level are also analyzed by a 
number of studies. The DSA is found to lower variance of NFIO, and as a result lower 
the average NFIO for all farms, although participation is the largest driver of this 
outcome (Nicholson and Stephenson, 2011). Milk production is found to be virtually 
unchanged under both DFA and DSA, while DSA has the potential to reduce 
government outlays, as well (Brown and Madison, 2013; Newton et. al, 2013). It is 
important to note, however, that once again, these outcomes are more likely with 
higher participation rates and depend greatly upon future price paths of milk and feed 
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prices. The contributions of this paper hope to build upon the analysis by conducting 
sensitivity analyses utilizing differing participation rates in different areas of the 
country and analyzing national level effects on price and quantity.  
The supply control components of the DSA result in an unequal diversion of 
payments and benefits (Woodard and Baker, 2013; Balagtas, 2013). It is understood 
the biggest winners from a switch from the MILC program to DSA would be large 
producers, and by and large the large producers in states that tend to have large 
average herd sizes. Because a number of the states with smaller herd sizes are 
undergoing significant growth, and because the exact ramifications of the proposed 
policies are not well-understood in terms of participation levels in certain states’ effect 
on others, the focus of this research is to bridge this gap in understanding. This study 
aims to grasp the ramifications of the transfers of wealth from region to region and 
build upon these studies to help understand future states of the world differing policy 
frameworks. 
Previous studies on milk markets tend to exhibit similar shortcomings that 
could jeopardize their findings. In particular, none of the previously described studies, 
or any dairy market studies to our knowledge, recognize the simultaneity between 
price and quantity. Because these studies ignore this endogenous relationship, 
parameter estimates are biased toward zero and inconsistent. Presumably, patterns 
exist in both milk production and agricultural prices across the country. Traditional 
regression approaches ignore relationships among panel members and assume 
exogenous shocks affect only those states in which they occur, without flowing 
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throughout the system. Approaches to account for these two shortcomings are 
described in later sections.    
This research is inspired by the desire to build on understanding of the 
available literature on implications of the supply controls in regions of the country and 
these effects on the national landscape. It is also necessary to improve upon the 
existing literature to create a monthly, state-level milk model of supply and demand 
that is both consistent and unbiased to examine regional effects of policies. Once a 
model is constructed, it is possible to analyze future states of the world through 
simulations and analyze the legislation’s overall impact on both the state and national 
levels of price, quantity, and economic welfare. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA 
Data are collected from an array of public sources at varying levels of 
aggregation.  The insights and assumptions contained herein build upon the existing 
literature on estimating milk supply and demand curves (Chavas, Kraus, and Jesse, 
1990; FAPRI, 2004; AMS, 2007; Bozic, Kanter, and Gould, 2012; Weersink and 
Tauer, 1990; Kaiser, 2000; Schmitt and Kaiser, 2002; Kaiser and Dong, 2006; Kaiser, 
2010). Chief among significant found variables in these studies focused on supply 
include milk price, feed price, and cow slaughter price. Demand shifters are a bit less 
straightforward, but tend to include both population and disposable income per capita. 
It is known that seasonal variation in milk production is inherent, as pastures 
grow most rapidly in the spring. Cows, as a result, produce the most milk in the spring 
in May and production tends to bottom out in November. Therefore, it is necessary to 
control for the peaks and valleys of milk production throughout the year if using a 
monthly approach. Similarly, consumption of dairy products is assumed to exhibit 
seasonality if modeled at the monthly level. Furthermore, dairy farmers and those 
associated with the industry commonly discuss a “3 year cycle”, implying 
approximately every three years, milk prices bottom out and begin to rise again. An 
attempt to control for both the seasonal and cyclical nature of milk prices and 
production is also included utilizing sinusoidal waves.  
Description of Data 
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 State level monthly milk supply and demand is necessary for this analysis 
because the margin insurance program is based upon monthly all-milk and feed 
prices.. Data collected from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
Quick Stats 2.0 are utilized and interpreted. Due to the disaggregated nature of the 
data at hand, there exists considerably less data at the state level than annual data. The 
USDA compiles dairy data for 23 states on a consistent basis, but as production 
concentration shifts from one state or region to another, so, too, do the states for which 
the USDA records data. For this reason, monthly state level data from 1998-2012 are 
utilized from the 19 states for which there exists complete information throughout the 
time period. These 19 states represent 84.14% to 88.24% of all U.S. milk production 
during this time period. To account for the remaining production, a 20th “state” is 
created to account for those states not included in the USDA’s data collection process. 
Milk production (lbs.), milk price received ($/cwt.), and milk cow slaughter price 
received ($/head) as an estimate of meat price are included. Summary statistics for 
each can be found in Table 5. 
Feed costs are less straightforward. The majority of milk supply literature 
(Chavas, Kraus, and Jesse, 1990; Bozic, Kanter, and Gould, 2012) use a 16% protein 
dairy ration as a proxy for feed costs. This data is no longer reported by the USDA on 
the state level, as it is collected regionally today. Furthermore, this regional data only 
covers the time period since 2001. The three important components of dairy feed 
include corn, soybean meal, and alfalfa hay. The USDA calculates a representative 
feed price index using corn, soybean, and hay prices. The formula for this index is 
found below:
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Table 5. Monthly State Level Supply Shifter Summary Statistics 
 
 
Milk Production  Milk Price Feed Price Cow Price Received  
State Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
AZ  310,184,358   53,661,178  14.99 3.03 7.28 2.66  1,583  243.0 
CA  3,070,346,369   368,713,574  14.18 2.85 6.96 2.55  1,495  211.6 
FL  187,324,022   25,828,215  18.83 3.40 6.40 2.54  1,644  290.5 
ID  834,798,883   210,870,571  14.20 2.95 6.89 2.50  1,575  289.0 
IL  165,363,128   10,511,470  15.78 3.28 6.20 2.38  1,510  231.1 
IN  251,351,955   41,264,618  16.02 3.19 5.93 2.35  1,494  258.1 
IA  339,284,916   24,201,921  15.49 3.15 5.89 2.38  1,491  249.7 
MI  579,329,609   96,088,429  15.82 3.14 5.99 2.34  1,587  279.3 
MN  732,804,469   47,524,929  15.64 3.23 5.53 2.38  1,464  240.8 
MO  151,402,235   27,610,558  15.72 3.20 6.31 2.71  1,361  235.1 
NM  564,748,603   104,476,643  14.84 2.86 7.52 2.63  1,549  242.0 
NY  1,017,966,480   51,579,207  16.13 3.12 6.99 2.23  1,438  229.7 
OH  399,027,933   33,587,121  16.17 3.20 6.85 2.63  1,506  242.5 
PA  887,452,514   40,913,333  16.98 3.08 7.46 2.41  1,535  246.1 
TX   585,296,089   137,559,370  15.97 2.95 7.04 2.88  1,546  281.7 
VT  217,100,559   9,856,895  16.42 3.17 7.03 2.38  1,550  271.1 
VA  148,743,017   9,729,539  17.55 3.32 6.67 2.34  1,528  241.4 
WA  471,022,346   26,714,251  15.33 3.05 7.05 2.43  1,539  280.4 
WI  1,984,882,682   150,105,254  15.60 3.19 5.60 2.30  1,533  249.9 
OTHER  1,981,810,056   92,794,673  15.56 3.01 6.28 2.50  1,512  241.5 
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where  is the price of a pound of feed,  is price of corn ($/bu.),  is price of 
soybeans ($/bu.), and  is the price of hay ($/ton). A number of states have monthly 
data available through Quick Stats 2.0 on each of the three feed components on a 
monthly basis. For those states for which monthly data does not exist, annual data is 
available in nearly every circumstance. The exception to this is the state of Vermont. 
The assumption that Vermont feed costs were the same as New York’s was made.  
Western states including Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Washington had 
missing values for soybean price.  
The assumption of a constant annual basis is adopted for those states in which 
monthly feed component prices are missing. For example, Arizona monthly corn 
prices do not exist in the data set, but annual prices are available. Upon reviewing the 
difference between annual average prices between Arizona and Illinois corn prices, 
this basis is used to approximate Arizona monthly prices based on the monthly Illinois 
price. Missing monthly values for corn, soybean, and hay prices for all states are 
priced off this type of basis utilizing Illinois as the base. After the missing values are 
calculated with the process just described, monthly state level 16% protein ration costs 
for all 19 states are calculated. For the 20th “state”, national average prices are used.  
Similarly, missing observations exist for the meat price for certain months for 
certain states. In order to accommodate this missing data, a similar assumption 
regarding the basis for feed prices is made for meat price, but instead of using Illinois 
for base calculation, the cow slaughter price in Kansas is used as the base.  MILC 
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payments were also collected for each month, when applicable, from the USDA Farm 
Service Agency (FSA). Average herd sizes were obtained for each state for the years 
during which the MILC was operating by taking the state’s total cow herd size and 
dividing by the number of licensed dairy operations by state, obtained from the USDA 
NASS Milk Production reports. MILC payments and average farm size are interacted 
to examine if this interaction has a significant effect on milk production. Furthermore, 
dummy variables for the 1996, 2002, and 2008 Farm Bills are included to determine if 
the policy regime have a significant effect on milk production, as well.  
State population and state-level disposable income per capita data are principal 
components among demand shifters in the literaute. These state-level values are 
obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
respsectively, and are found in Table 6.  
For the purposes of robustness, the same data are also collected from Quick 
Stats 2.0 on the annual state level, national monthly level, and national annual level 
over the same time period. Data at these less aggregated levels are much more 
plentiful, and fewer assumptions are necessary to create the complete dataset. The 
summary statistics for these different levels of aggregation inculding annual state, 
monthly national, and annual national levels are found in Tables 7, 8, and 9, 
respectively. 
From the monthly state summary statistics included herein, it is clear large 
differences in the level data from one state to the next exist for nearly every variable. 
Consider the case of viewing the milk production in California and production in 
Virginia. Large disparities exist between the sheer sizes of the two industries—an 
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Table 6. Monthly State Level Demand Shifter Summary Statistics 
 
Personal Disposable 
Income State Population 
State Mean SD Mean SD 
AZ  29,034.92   2,986.56   5,803,261   544,975  
CA  35,135.87   3,198.45   35,701,626   1,458,945  
FL  32,503.55   3,377.29   17,579,440   1,222,749  
ID  27,300.21   2,653.86   1,433,056   115,896  
IL  34,898.89   3,206.33   12,620,871   177,207  
IN  29,232.04   2,473.50   6,285,700   172,181  
IA  31,423.18   4,543.54   2,979,894   54,205  
MI  30,347.67   2,005.43   9,959,392   70,281  
MN  34,775.17   3,350.29   5,122,554   168,332  
MO  30,365.41   2,959.16   5,794,155   163,319  
NM  26,967.42   3,618.15   1,937,231   99,626  
NY  37,815.42   4,486.38   19,161,047   196,910  
OH  30,373.78   2,675.14   11,454,286   74,623  
PA  33,420.23   3,822.45   12,482,836   177,432  
TX   31,523.96   3,974.95   23,016,696   1,838,792  
VT  32,399.95   4,406.14   618,437   7,868  
VA  35,765.70   4,269.39   7,562,826   394,499  
WA  35,556.28   3,884.51   6,310,176   355,789  
WI  31,859.18   3,187.54   5,535,833   135,857  
OTHER  31,665.87   4,843.35   104,309,790   4,449,874  
 
external shock to the system certainly affects the production in both states, but the 
actual amount of milk production increase or decrease will almost certainly be 
different in the two states. Because of the discrepancies between the sizes of states’ 
dairy industries, the percentage change in milk production in response to percentage 
change in milk price, feed costs, and cow slaughter costs are most relevant to the 
purposes of this study. Likewise, a 1% change in milk production in California is 
likely to affect the national landscape more than the same 1% change in milk 
production in Virginia.  For this reason, and due to the large disparity in terms of
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Table 7. State Annual Level Supply Shifter Summary Statistics 
 
  Milk Production Milk Price Feed Price Cow Price Received 
State Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
AZ  3,717,133,333   585,452,068   14.94   2.66  7.46 2.79 1580.67 241.29 
CA  36,795,533,333   4,386,318,646   14.17   2.51  7.03 2.58 1494.67 204.62 
FL  1,427,600,000   40,598,733   18.78   2.93  6.51 2.50 1642.00 283.60 
ID  9,992,866,667   2,580,116,439   14.21   2.62  7.08 2.64 1577.33 281.64 
IL  1,985,466,667   71,984,985   15.75   2.98  6.24 2.44 1508.67 229.72 
IN  3,011,800,000   497,182,806   15.97   2.85  6.54 2.68 1492.67 254.09 
IA  4,070,400,000   256,190,443   15.44   2.84  6.06 2.58 1488.67 245.09 
MI  6,942,733,333   1,167,847,377   15.81   2.82  6.05 2.43 1586.00 281.34 
MN  8,797,333,333   451,748,929   15.66   2.92  5.68 2.60 1462.67 237.86 
MO  1,820,200,000   308,448,468   15.66   2.79  5.66 2.30 1360.67 229.27 
NM  6,761,066,667   1,272,113,285   14.83   2.53  11.14 4.11 1548.00 239.89 
NY  12,212,133,333   434,850,691   16.11   2.79  6.76 2.19 1436.67 222.09 
OH  4,787,000,000   364,251,679   16.15   2.92  6.50 2.49 1504.67 240.47 
PA  10,652,533,333   262,048,760   16.98   2.76  7.20 2.31 1536.67 239.30 
TX   7,017,400,000   1,633,965,020   15.93   2.59  6.35 2.45 1544.00 271.60 
VT  2,605,533,333   72,256,356   16.41   2.86  7.11 2.45 1549.33 271.59 
VA  208,200,000   43,819,761   17.54   2.97  6.49 2.57 1526.67 237.81 
WA  5,649,933,333   258,337,948   15.37   2.75  7.31 2.61 1538.00 271.43 
WI  23,811,200,000   1,648,135,145   15.59   2.84  5.65 2.37 1531.33 245.44 
OTHER  23,789,726,667   466,511,720   15.40   2.65  5.74 2.58 1507.33 231.32 
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Table 8. Monthly National Level Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
Milk production, in lbs.  14,881,061,453   1,200,085,901  
Milk price received, in $/cwt.  15.41   2.98  
Corn price received, in $/cwt.  3.16   1.55  
Soybean price received, in $/bu.  7.70   3.13  
Hay price received, in $/ton  118.55   36.59  
Milk cow price received, in $/head  1,512   242  
Feed costs, in $/cwt. Milk  6.28   2.50  
Disposable personal income, in $  31,666   4,843  
National population  295,669,107   11,734,546  
 
Table 9. Annual National Level Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
Milk production, in lbs.  176,055,793,333   13,460,456,336  
Milk price received, in $/cwt.  15.40   2.65  
Corn price received, in $/cwt.  3.32   1.72  
Soybean price received, in $/bu.  7.80   3.23  
Hay price received, in $/ton  113   35  
Milk cow price received, in $/head  1,507   231  
Feed costs, in $/cwt. Milk  5.74   2.58  
Disposable personal income, in $  31,621   5,024  
National population  295,559,024   12,174,568  
 
the sheer sizes of state milk productions, all values are converted into logarithmic 
form. Instead of the model implying identical changes in actual milk production across 
all states due to the same shock, the model instead implies identical percentage change 
in milk production as a result of the same shock. This strict assumption is relaxed to an 
extent with the inclusion of a spatial network model described in the following 
section. This double log functional form also offers simplicity for interpreting 
coefficients, as the slope parameter can be viewed as a direct measure of elasticity.  
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From economic theory and a solid understanding of milk production, it is 
possible to hypothesize the sign of the coefficients for the various variables included 
in the supply model. For example, logged value of milk should be positively related 
with the logged lagged value of milk production, or the logged lagged milk production 
value. Basic economic theory implies the coefficient on logged milk price should be 
positive, as producers are willing to supply more milk at higher prices. Likewise, 
logged feed and logged cow slaughter prices should have negative coefficients. As 
feed prices increase, farmers could feed less to their cows, and as a result decrease 
overall milk production. Similarly, as the value of cull cows increases, producers may 
increase their culling rate to receive a higher price for their cows. If this is the case, it 
is possible that overall milk production may decrease as a result. Finally, the MILC 
payments are expected to be positively-related to milk production, whereas MILC 
payments interacted with the average farm size is expected to be negatively related to 
milk production.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODS AND MODELS 
 The following section is composed of two discussions first focusing on milk 
supply, followed by a discussion focusing on milk demand. First, replications of 
previous supply models are attempted. After, a discussion on the necessity of 
instrumental variables and a spatial filter follows for the supply models. Finally, an 
overview of the framework for the state-level milk supply model is discussed. 
Following the discussion on the supply side model, a summary of the framework for 
the demand model estimation is described. A similar approach is taken for the demand 
side as the supply side, and specification and statistical tests are also provided for both 
sides of the market.  
Replication of Previous Supply Models  
Attempts are made to replicate a number of the previous econometrics models 
of milk supply, but to little avail. Proprietary information appears to be one of the 
main drivers of this phenomenon, but it is clear there are other issues at play that make 
replication so difficult. The AMS (2007) study, however, utilizes strictly public data 
and is straightforward in its structure. An attempt to recreate this model is made, and 
although results are not identical, the statistical significance of parameters and the 
signs of these parameters are similar for the time period the study covers from 1980-
2005.  Once data are included beyond the years included in the study, the model 
becomes unstable and coefficients do not make theoretical sense. This model 
specification does not make sense to use, given the annual nature of its structure and 
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the volatility introduced into the industry since 2005. Results from the replication are 
displayed below, next to parameters from the study and parameters resulting from the 
introduction of additional years into the model.  
 Although the replication using what should be identical data is not exactly the 
same from 1980-2005, the significant variables in the number of cows equation are the 
same and similar in magnitude. In the year over year change in milk per cow equation, 
results are less similar in magnitude but similar in sign. For example, the coefficients 
on the lagged values of the logged total cow herd size, dummy variable for 1984, and 
dummy variable for 1987 are all statistically significant in the original study as well as 
the replication. Similarly, the coefficients in the year-on-year change in milk per cow 
are statistically significant for lagged milk price divided by the all product CPI and the 
feed price divided by the all product CPI. In the replication, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for 1984 is also significant. It is troubling to see such a decrease in 
the R-squared value between the original study and the replication for the change in 
milk per cow equation, although these values are more similar in the logged total cow 
equation above.  
It is easy to see as the sample period increases to include the years 1980-2012, 
subtle changes begin to develop. Although the signs on the coefficients remain the 
same as those in the original replication displayed in model (2), the R-squared value in 
model (3) decreases in both equations as a result of losing statistical significance on 
the 1984 dummy variable in the first equation and half the variables in the second 
equation. This phenomenon is likely related to the increased volatility in feed prices, 
as well as the changing structure of the United States dairy industry over
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Table 10. AMS 2007 Replication, Annual Milk Production by State 
Variable  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
AMS 
 
1980-2005 Rep 
 
1980-2012 Rep 
 
1998-2012 Rep 
 log(cow_tot) 
 
log(cow_tot) 
 
log(cow_tot) 
 
log(cow_tot)   
Intercept 0.666   -0.670051   0.365049   10.788677 *** 
 
(0.73) 
 
(-0.45) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(2.35) 
 log(milk_p/feed) 0.03  
 
0.019175 
 
-0.013198 
 
-0.032396 
 
 
(1.46) 
 
(1.23) 
 
(-1.30) 
 
(-1.83) 
 log(trend: year-1979) -0.013 
 
-0.005343 
 
-0.005697 
 
-0.02829 
 
 
(-1.5) 
 
(-0.95) 
 
(-0.97) 
 
(-0.99) 
 lag(log(cow_tot)) 0.929 *** 1.03422 *** 0.974657 *** 0.332204 
 
 
(9.61) 
 
(11.78) 
 
(11.27) 
 
(1.18) 
 log(cow_sl/milk_p) -0.013 
 
0.024109 
 
0.01528 
 
0.008521 
 
 
(-1.04) 
 
(1.16) 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.61) 
 Dummy: 1984 -0.021 *** -0.022153 *** -0.019456 
   
 
(-2.11) 
 
(-2.22) 
 
(-1.72) 
   Dummy: 1986 -0.02 
 
-0.020188 
 
-0.008218 
   
 
(-1.59) 
 
(-1.723) 
 
(-0.66) 
   Dummy: 1987 -0.043 *** -0.041322 *** -0.035304 *** 
  
 
(-3.47) 
 
(-4.02) 
 
(-3.05) 
   Dummy: 1998 -0.013 
 
-0.002519 
 
-0.000851 
 
0.00137 
 
 
(-1.32) 
 
(-0.22) 
 
(-0.07) 
 
(0.13) 
 
         R-squared 0.9993 
 
0.9907 
 
0.9855 
 
0.5199 
 
        
  
Variable  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 AMS 
 
1980-2005 Rep 
 
1980-2012 Rep 
 
1998-2012 Rep 
 Δ milk_cow   Δ milk_cow   Δ milk_cow   Δ milk_cow   
Intercept 333 *** 198.37 
 
306.421245 *** 51.87484 
 
 
(2.29) 
 
(1.36) 
 
(2.35) 
 
(0.12) 
 lag(milk_p/cpi_all) 6393 *** 5332.415819 *** 1301.52271 
 
4036.386887 
 
 
(2.44) 
 
(1.97) 
 
(0.82) 
 
(0.84) 
 feed/cpi_all -19203 *** -11713.83991 *** -3035.054453 
 
-1343.33866 
 
 
(-2.63) 
 
(-1.91) 
 
(-0.08) 
 
(-0.25) 
 Dummy: 1984 -297 
 
-447.571439 *** -420.532632 *** 
  
 
(-1.67) 
 
(-2.55) 
 
(-2.37) 
   
         R-squared 0.9952   0.3088   0.1806   0.063   
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this time period. This phenomenon is further exemplified in the model containing only 
years 1998-2012, as R-squared values decrease dramatically and little, if any, useful 
information is obtained from the results. Statistical significance of the parameters is all 
but lost as it is clear other factors are at play in determining the supply of milk other 
than the data included in the 2007 study.  
 A monthly state level milk supply model with a simple OLS regression with 
state level fixed effects is estimated as a first step toward modeling milk supply. First, 
logged state level milk price was included as a variable. After, logged state level milk 
price plus MILC payments, if applicable, are included. Results are found in Table 11.  
 Despite high goodness of fit measures, the model is troubling for a number of 
reasons, particularly when looking at the price elasticity of milk supply. Previous 
studies find a national level elasticity of milk supply in in the range of 0.06-0.08. It is 
plausible to  expect level elasticities to be higher at the state level as a result of the 
mobility of both milk and heifers across state lines. Furthermore, parameter estimates 
on logged feed and logged cow slaughter prices are expected to be negative, but in 
these models they are positive. For these reasons, it is necessary to employ alternative 
estimation techniques.  
Fixed versus Random Effects  
Due to the nature of the data, a model with fixed effects is assumed to be 
appropriate. Time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity of states is assumed to exist, 
and must be accounted for. This is qualified by a Hausman test on the data, which 
produces a resounding rejection of the random-effects model.  
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Table 11. State Monthly OLS Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
 
Variable  
(1)   (2)   
Logged milk 
production   
Logged milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.017994 *** 
  
 
(2.16) 
   Logged milk price plus 
MILC 
  
0.023022 *** 
   
(2.27) 
 Logged lagged milk 
production 0.904762 *** 0.904861 *** 
 
(128.76) 
 
(128.76) 
 Logged feed price 0.007441 
 
0.005738 
 
 
(1.79) 
 
(1.24) 
 Logged cow price 0.001828 
 
0.001475 
 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.27) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.013342 *** 0.013444 *** 
 
(10.54) 
 
(10.72) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.019231 *** 0.019392 *** 
 
(14.90) 
 
(14.82) 
 Cosine cyclical trend -0.000193 
 
-0.000119 
 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(-0.094) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.002826 
 
-0.002798 
 
 
(-1.71) 
 
(-1.75) 
 
     R-squared 0.9967 
 
0.9967 
 # observations 3580 
 
3580 
 # variables 28  28  
 
Table 12. Hausman Test Results 
Fixed versus Random Effects 
Hausman Specification Test       
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2(6) = 99.49 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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 Due to the results of the test above, individual-level effects are best modeled 
through the fixed-effects specification. The use of fixed effects is in line with the 
hypothesis there may exist time-invariant effects in the sample;  that is, each state 
could have its own intercept due to regulatory conditions, weather patterns, and other 
unobservable characteristics of each state.  
Instrumental Variables 
A number of assumptions must hold to implement a linear regression model. 
Included in these assumptions is the zero-conditional mean assumption, implying the 
mean of the error terms, given a clue of the independent variable , is zero. Written 
algebraically, this implies the following:  
 
One instance in which this assumption does not hold is the case of endogenous 
variables. Market supply is established by aggregating individual supply schedules 
from all players in the market. Supply functions are rarely, if ever, actually observed 
in the marketplace. Rather, equilibrium prices and quantities are easily visible, where 
quantity supplied equals quantity demanded to discover the market-clearing price. A 
change from one period to the next in equilibrium price or quantity does not 
necessarily provide insight into the actual shape of the supply or demand curves, 
rather, it provides differing equilibrium points. An ordinary least squares regression of 
quantities on prices fails to identify the supply relationship (Baum, 2006). This is 
known as the identification problem. It is necessary to utilize instruments to identify 
the curve, which are factors determined outside the economic model, but factors that 
have an effect on the endogenous variable.  
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In the case of endogenous variables, consistent estimates are only obtained 
when instrumental variables satisfy two conditions: the instrument is uncorrelated with 
the error term but highly correlated with the endogenous variable(s) (Baum, 2006). 
The second assumption is easily testable. For this reason, it is necessary to utilize 
exogenous observable variables to help construct parameters for supply in order to 
properly model the system at hand. This is typically accomplished by the use of a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimator, which is consistent, but not unbiased (Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001). In a 2SLS model, multiple instruments are combined into one 
optimal instrument to generate predicted values of the endogenous variable, in this 
case milk price. These predicted values of the endogenous variable are the optimal 
linear combinations of the information contained in the instruments. The “second 
stage” of the regression then calls for regressing the dependent variable on the 
predicted values of the endogenous variable and all other exogenous variables. This is 
a consistent estimate of parameters in a model where some of the regressors in X are 
correlated with the disturbance process. 
According to Baum (2006), “the parameters in an equation are said to be 
identified when we have sufficient valid instruments so that the 2SLS estimator 
produces unique estimates”. Consider instruments matrix Z. Coefficients from 2SLS 
are unique if (Z’Z) is nonsingular and (Z’X) has full rank k, known as the rank 
condition. In other words, there must be enough correlation between the endogenous 
variables and the instruments to produce unique estimates. The order condition 
requires, essentially, that there be at least as many instruments as endogenous 
variables. If the rank condition fails, the equation is underidentified. If the rank of 
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(Z’X) is k, the equation is exactly identified, and if (Z’K) is greater than k, the 
equation is overidentified (Baum, 2006). Instruments that meet the rank condition but 
are not sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables are known as weak 
instruments. It is important to note, however, that weak is a relative term.  
In order to build upon the instrumental variable approach put forth by Wright 
(1928) to instrument for milk price in the supply model, we instrument for milk price 
in the supply model with demand shifters (state population and disposable income per 
capita), and instrument for milk price in the demand model with supply shifters 
(lagged milk production, feed costs, and cow slaughter prices).  
Utilizing a 2SLS framework, the previous model was re-estimated using the 
demand shifters as instruments, and the results are summarized in Table 13. As 
expected, the elasticity of milk supply with respect to milk price increases 
dramatically when instruments are used. While it appears to be too large at this point, 
it is also interesting to note the signs on the coefficients for feed and cow slaughter 
price also switched from positive to negative, which falls more closely in line with 
what we would expect. We must attempt to ensure the instruments utilized to 
instrument for milk price meet the rank and order conditions. The order condition, 
which is necessary but not sufficient, is satisfied, as two instruments are used to 
account for the single endogenous regressor in the case of the supply model, and three 
instruments are used in the demand model. Results from the first stage can be found in 
Table 14.  
A Shea’s partial R-squared of 0.02 and an F-statistic of 36.27 relate the 
statistical strength of the instruments. Staiger and Stock (1997) proposed the notion 
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that when only one endogenous variable exists on the right hand side of the equation, 
as we have in this case, an F-statistic of greater than ten implies the instruments are 
Table 13. Monthly State 2SLS Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable 
Logged milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.544055 *** 
 
(4.76) 
 Logged milk price plus MILC 
  
   Logged lagged milk 
production 0.941936 *** 
 
(85.89) 
 Logged feed price -0.190102 *** 
 
(-4.41) 
 Logged cow price -0.063461 *** 
 
(-3.91) 
 Cosine seasonal trend -0.004584 *** 
 
(-1.07) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.047427 *** 
 
(7.44) 
 Cosine cyclical trend 0.017797 *** 
 
(4.14) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.073114 *** 
 
(-4.76) 
 
   R-squared 0.9929 
 # observations 3580 
 # variables 28   
 
strong. In our case, an F-statistic of 36.27, coupled with theory described above, leads 
us to believe our instruments are not weak.  
Testing the relevance of instruments can also be conducted through a number 
of methods. We begin the examination of instrument relevance with the approach put 
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forth from Anderson (1984). All of the canonical correlations between the X and Z 
matrices must be significantly different from zero if an equation estimated with IVs is 
identified from a numerical standpoint, and failure to reject the null hypothesis calls 
Table 14. Monthly State 2SLS Stage 1 Results 
Dependent variable is:  
Variable  
Logged milk 
price   
   Logged lagged milk production -0.0535663 *** 
 
(-2.83) 
 Logged feed price 0.4475495 *** 
 
(39.40) 
 Logged cow price 0.2446355 *** 
 
(16.98) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.0358878 *** 
 
(11.60) 
 Cosine cyclical trend -0.0990716 *** 
 
(-32.71) 
 Logged state population -0.247842 *** 
 
(-6.18) 
 Logged disposable income -0.1656473 *** 
 
(-2.07) 
 
   First-stage F-statistic 36.27 
 Partial R-squared 0.020   
 
the identification of the estimated equation into question. Results from the 
underidentification test for both supply and demand can be found below, which led to 
a sound rejection of the null hypothesis.  
Table 15. Monthly State 2SLS Underidentification Test 
Underidentification Test 
Anderson canon. Corr. LM stat = 71.221 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.0000 
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In order to test for over-identifying restrictions, it is common to use the Sargan 
test, summarized in Table 16 below. 
 
Table 16. Monthly State 2SLS Sargan Test 
Sargan Test  
Sargan stat = 14.730 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0001 
 
 The test results instruct to reject the null hypothesis that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. While this appears potentially troubling at first, it is important to 
note the Sargan statistic is primarily utilized for models estimating IVs with time 
series or cross-sectional data. In instances where panel data are available, testing of 
over-identifying restrictions is not nearly as important, as these restrictions are often 
automatically built in to the models estimated using panel data.  While it is possible 
“better” instruments exist, the instruments utilized operate sufficiently, and, coupled 
with the strategies described in the spatial discussion to follow, sufficiently serve the 
purpose of this research. Therefore, the variables included in the first stage to 
instrument for logged milk price are appropriate for both the supply and demand 
models.  
Arellano-Bond Estimator 
At this point, the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator may be appropriate. The data 
contains an endogenous variable, fixed effects are appropriate, and a lagged dependent 
variable is included as an explanatory variable, all of which are important components 
of a successful Arellano-Bond model (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  Below are the 
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results for the Arellano-Bond estimator for the supply model with different 
specifications.  
In the first model, the logged milk price is instrumented with the logged values 
 
Table 17. Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimator Parameters 
 
Dependent variable is:  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
Variable  
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
         Logged milk 
price -0.0118 
 
-0.0644 *** -0.0108 
 
-0.00992 
 
 
(-1.54) 
 
(-9.69) 
 
(-1.42) 
 
(-1.29) 
 Logged lagged 
milk 
production 0.998 *** 0.434 *** 0.997 *** 0.998 
 
 
(597.62) 
 
(23.36) 
 
(660.08) 
 
(596.28) 
 Logged feed 
price 0.00534 
 
0.109 *** 0.00495 
 
0.00467 
 
 
(1.35) 
 
(22.73) 
 
(1.26) 
 
(1.18) 
 Logged cow 
price 0.00463 
 
0.0567 *** 0.00417 
 
0.00423 
 
 
(0.70) 
 
(10.25) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.64) 
 Cosine cyclical 
trend 0.0178 *** -0.000822 
 
0.0177 *** 0.0177 
 
 
(11.90) 
 
(-0.64) 
 
(11.87) 
 
(11.85) 
 Sin cyclical 
trend -0.0013 
 
-0.00168 
 
-0.00117 
 
-0.00109 
 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(-1.30) 
 
(-0.71) 
 
(-0.66) 
 Constant 0.0302 
   
0.0427 
 
0.0345 
   (0.53)    (0.77)  (0.60)  
 
of the state’s population and disposable income per capita with the system GMM 
estimator, whereas the second model is the same except the difference GMM estimator 
is utilized. In both cases, the coefficient on logged milk price is opposite of 
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expectations in a model of supply, as are the coefficients on logged feed price and 
logged cow price. Both models contain positive and statistically significant parameters 
for logged lagged milk production, but overall model 2 appears to have higher more 
significant coefficients.  
In model 3, lagged levels from lag=3 to lag=4 are included in the model, 
whereas model 4 includes only lags from t=3. Results for parameters are both similar, 
although model 3 has more significant parameters than model 4. Both models also 
result in statistically insignificant negative coefficients for logged milk price, which is 
unfortunate but not surprising. Arellano-Bond estimators are appropriate for the 
aforementioned reasons, as well as cases in which there are a large number of panel 
members over a relatively short time period. The data included in this study, however, 
contain a relatively small number of states (n=20) over a relatively longer time 
dimension (t=179). For this reason, more appropriate models must be examined and 
analyzed. It is also important to note there may be more complex issues at play in the 
market and must be accounted for before a plausible model can be constructed.  
Spatial Dependence  
 Spatial autocorrelation and dependence in supply and demand across states 
leads to violations of the standard OLS regression model. Major milk production areas 
in the United States historically have been centered near the population centers of the 
country, due in no small part to the perishability of milk and the lack of refrigeration 
technologies and transportation systems during the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century. Class I differentials are the constant factors added to the Class I price mover 
to determine Class I milk price in any given month in federal milk marketing orders. 
 55 
The differential varies by location, and tends to be lowest in areas with high milk 
supplies and low populations and highest in areas of moderate milk supplies and high 
populations. For example, the Class I differential in the Upper Midwest FMMO is 
highest near Chicago, and decreases as one moves northwest toward North Dakota. 
This differential, or spatial difference in price, reflects the cost of transporting milk to 
more populated areas. Spatial regression methods allow us to account for dependence 
between observations, oftentimes from observations located in space (LeSage, 2008).  
Spatial autoregressive models can be employed when spatial autocorrelation or 
dependence is present (LeSage, 2008). Dependence between observations often arises 
when data are collected from various points across space. This phenomenon is referred 
to as spatial dependence. Most are generally more familiar with time dependence in 
time series literature, which often arise as the result of costly adjustment costs, 
behavioral frictions, or biological response lags, indicating a dependence from one 
time period to the next. Ertur and Koch (2007) used the notion of “spatial diffusion 
with friction” to describe the need for a spatial lag, which takes the form of an average 
of neighboring regions. Furthermore, latent influences such as infrastructure and 
culture can be accounted for by taking into account the dependent variables of 
neighboring units. The standard cross-sectional spatial lag model is as follows: 
 
 In the standard model above, ρ is the spatial lag coefficient with a value 
between -1 and 1, W is a sparse spatial weight matrix where  >0 if i and j are 
contiguous, and W is row-standardized such that the sum of each row is equal to 1. 
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The term Wy is a spatially weighted average of an observation’s neighbors. The data-
generating process can be re-written as follows: 
 
Due to the  component, and because it is non-sparse, every 
observation is a function of not only its own exogenous variables and error, but also of 
its neighbors, the neighbors of its neighbors, etc. with distance decay. The magnitude 
of this effect is determined by the value of the spatial lag coefficient. This model 
allows for spatial feedback effects and spatial autocorrelation.  
In the panel data case, the model can be expressed as follows: 
 
 Again, the model can be re-written as the following: 
 
 A spatial autoregressive (SAR) model is implemented without the use of 
instruments, and the results are below. In general, the signs on the coefficients are as 
expected, although because instruments are ignored, the elasticity of supply with 
respect to milk price is very low. Of course, an elasticity of supply with respect to 
milk price of 0.0218 is  The model produces a positive and statistically significant 
parameter estimate for ρ, as expected.  
 It is possible to test for correlation in the dependent variables and the residuals 
of a model to ensure a spatial network model is appropriate. Here, and LM statistic of 
greater than 6.635 calls for the rejection of the null hypothesis of no spatial 
correlation. Similarly, a Moran’s I-statistic for spatial correlation in the residuals of a 
regression model of greater than 1.96 rejects the null hypothesis of no spatial 
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correlation.  It is clear form a statistical standpoint, and given knowledge of the dairy 
industry, an accurate model of milk supply simply cannot ignore spatial relationships. 
Therefore, a SAR model is appropriate for this study.  
Table 18. Monthly State SAR Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable 
is: 
Variable  
Logged milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.0218 *** 
 
(2.88) 
 Logged lagged milk 
production 0.850106 *** 
 
(118.38) 
 Logged feed price -0.03491 *** 
 
(-8.82) 
 Logged cow price -0.010199 *** 
 
(-2.03) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.016504 *** 
 
(14.39) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.010735 *** 
 
(8.92) 
 Cosine cyclical trend -0.000818 
 
 
(-0.72) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.000501 
 
 
(-0.33) 
 Rho 0.298984 *** 
 
(28.11) 
 
   R-squared 0.9972 
 # observations 3580 
 # variables 29   
 
Table 19. Monthly State Spatial Tests 
LM Lag Statistic for Panel Regression Model 
 
LM = 647.4915 
 
chi1 = 6.6400 
LM Error Statistic for Panel Regression Model 
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LM = 5456.6 
 
chi1 = 6.6400 
Moran's I-statistic for Spatial Correlation in Residuals 
 
morani = 0.7934 
  istat = 74.0215 
 
Spatial Autoregressive Model with Instrumental Variables 
The next step is to combine these two approaches to develop a SAR model 
utilizing instrumental variables. Again, the demand shifters (state population and 
disposable income per capita) are used to instrument for milk price. Rather than 
include the actual logged milk price in the SAR model, a fitted value of logged milk 
price is generated via the OLS regression of milk price on all exogenous variables 
including the demand shifters in the first stage and included in the second stage. After 
these fitted milk prices are obtained, they are inserted into the SAR panel model 
described earlier and the model is estimated. Attempts at utilizing logged milk price, 
logged milk price plus MILC payments, and including dummy variables for Farm 
Bills are all conducted and are summarized in Table 20.  
A cursory look at the results are promising. Signs of the coefficients in each 
case are as we expect, and elasticity with respect to milk price are higher than those 
found in previous studies, but not so high as to cause alarm. The spatial autoregressive 
parameter is positive and statistically significant in every instance. The first model 
reported in Table 20 appears to be the most plausible and has high goodness of fit and 
statistical significance. We will focus on this model throughout the rest of the study.  
Because the process of instrumenting was broken apart from the rest of the 
estimation, it is necessary to bootstrap the standard errors, because otherwise they are 
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biased. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported with the parameter estimates. It is 
also believed that a spatial approach will also aid in the instrumentation that takes 
place in the first stage. By incorporating spatially-lagged information and 
 
Table 20. Monthly State SAR Panel Model with IVs 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable  
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.157139 *** 
  
0.113264 *** 
 
(5.87) 
   
(4.42) 
 Logged milk price plus MILC 
  
0.20852 ***
  
   
(7.32) 
   Logged lagged milk 
production 0.851848 *** 0.853463 *** 0.853617 *** 
 
(119.13) 
 
(119.66) 
 
(118.32) 
 Logged feed price -0.072235 *** -0.104444 *** -0.68259 *** 
 
(-8.20) 
 
(-9.50) 
 
(-5.245) 
 Logged cow price -0.027421 *** -0.031229 *** -0.010654 
 
 
(-4.60) 
 
(-5.35) 
 
(-1.66) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.012013 *** 0.012711 *** 0.015925 *** 
 
(8.38) 
 
10 
 
(13.22) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.017669 *** 0.019521 *** 0.014353 *** 
 
(9.90) 
 
11.09 
 
(8.17) 
 Cosine cyclical trend 0.003782 *** 0.004665 *** 0.001585 
 
 
(2.64) 
 
3.36 
 
(1.22) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.01848 *** -0.019037 *** -0.007221 *** 
 
(-4.96) 
 
(-6.09) 
 
(-3.02) 
 Rho 0.309973 *** 0.306964 *** 0.305977 *** 
 
(28.58) 
 
28.61 
 
(28.86) 
 Dummy variable: 1996 Farm 
Bill 
    
0.004423 
 
     
(1.03) 
 Dummy Variable: 2002 Farm 
Bill 
    
-0.002243 
 
     
(-0.49) 
 MILC payments 
    
0.015499 *** 
     
(4.15) 
 MILC payments*average 
    
-0.000002 
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farm size 
     
(-0.81) 
 R-squared 0.9973
 
0.9973
 
0.9972 
 # observations 3580 
 
3580 
 
3580 
 # variables 29  29  33  
instrumenting logged milk price on the new information, it is believed the instruments 
will increase in strength and serve our purposes better. Results from the first stage are 
found Table 21.  
Table 21. Monthly State SAR 1st Stage Results 
Dependent variable is:  
Variable  
Logged 
milk price   
   
Logged lagged milk production 
-
0.0216787 
 
 
(-1.11) 
 Logged feed price 0.0524019 
 
 
(1.74) 
 Logged cow price 0.0423793 
 
 
(1.08) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.0293809 *** 
 
(9.25) 
 
Cosine cyclical trend 
-
0.0974187 *** 
 
(-33.2) 
 
Logged state population 
-
0.0053752 
 
 
(-0.07) 
 
Logged disposable income 
-
0.4496647 *** 
 
(-10.27) 
 Spatial lagged logged milk 
production 
-
0.2403325 *** 
 
(-6.43) 
 Spatial lagged logged feed price 0.4730368 *** 
 
(14.49) 
 Spatial lagged logged cow price 0.248224 *** 
 
(6.05) 
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First-stage F-statistic 68.883 
 Partial R-squared 0.0884   
 
Both the partial R-squared and the first stage F-statistic increase in the supply 
framework with the introduction of spatial components. Furthermore, the decisions 
resulting from tests discussed in the previous section do not change, indicating the 
additional information does not harm, but more than likely aids, in explaining the 
variation in logged milk price. The results of these tests are summarized in Tables 22 
and 23.  
Table 22. Monthly State SAR Underidentification Test 
Underidentification Test 
Anderson canon. Corr. LM stat = 314.839 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.0000 
 
Table 23. Monthly State SAR Sargan Test 
Sargan Test  
Sargan stat = 212.045 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 
Monthly Milk Demand 
A similar approach is taken to develop a demand model to interact with the 
estimated supply curve to produce equilibrium price and quantity.  Rather than 
instrument utilizing demand shifters, however, the all-milk price is instrumented with 
the supply shifters. Supply shifters include the logged lagged milk production, logged 
feed price, and logged cow slaughter price. It is believed that these items have a 
significant impact on actual milk supply, but are unlikely to affect demand.  
Signs of coefficients in the demand model may again be hypothesized 
borrowing from economic theory. The coefficient on the logged milk price is expected 
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to be negative, which implies a downward sloping demand curve. Kaiser (2010) 
explains this coefficient is small, consistent with previous studies due to the 
importance of milk as a staple in the American diet. The coefficient on logged 
personal disposable income is perhaps less straightforward.  Previous studies (Kaiser, 
2000; Schmitt and Kaiser, 2002; Kaiser and Dong, 2006; Kaiser, 2010; AMS, 2007) 
find a positive coefficient on the logged personal disposable income. Kaiser (2010) 
also investigates the role of the percentage of food eaten away from home (FAFH), 
and determines the availability of milk substitutes away from cause this measure to be 
negatively correlated with per capita fluid milk consumption, whereas it could 
increase other areas of dairy consumption, such as cheese. Furthermore, French, Wall, 
and Mitchell (2010) determined higher income household spend a higher percentage 
of food expenditures away from home compared to those households with lower 
incomes.  Given these findings, it is unclear what sign we expect the coefficient on 
disposable income to have. The logged state population coefficient is expected to be 
positive, as a higher population, in general, is expected to demand a higher quantity of 
dairy products.  Seasonality is also vital to include in the monthly demand model, thus 
seasonal variables are included in the models to capture the cyclical dairy demand 
throughout the year, as well as a time variable to capture the overall trend in dairy 
consumption throughout the time period.  
Once again, a basic OLS model without the use of instrumental variables or 
spatial networks is first estimated. The results are summarized in Table 24. The 
coefficient on logged milk price is positive, which is troubling and goes against 
economic theory. For the reasons mentioned above, it is also clear that when using a 
linear regression model and ignoring the endogeneity inherit in the relationship 
between price and quantity, the model suffers from being biased and inconsistent. 
Again, it is necessary to instrument for milk price to account for these shortcomings. 
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.Results from a 2SLS approach using supply shifters as instruments are found in Table 
25.    
 
Table 24. Monthly State OLS Demand Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable 
Logged milk 
quantity   
Logged milk price 0.0178 
 
 
(1.52) 
 Logged disposable income -0.0131118 *** 
 
(-3.46) 
 Logged state population 1.544963 *** 
 
(23.32) 
 Cosine seasonal trend -0.021901 *** 
 
(-8.20) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.038355 *** 
 
(13.99) 
 Trend 0.12992 *** 
 
(3.41) 
 
   R-squared 0.984 
 # observations 3580 
 # variables 26   
Table 25. Monthly State 2SLS Demand Parameter Estimates 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable 
Logged milk 
quantity   
Logged milk price -0.005524 
 
 
(-0.25) 
 Logged disposable income -0.102794 *** 
 
(-2.32) 
 Logged state population 1.550079 *** 
 
(23.34) 
 Cosine seasonal trend -0.021146 *** 
 
(-7.71) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.037028 *** 
 
(12.56) 
 Trend 0.011604 *** 
 
(2.92) 
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   R-squared 0.984 
 # observations 3580 
 # variables 26   
Results are similar for the 2SLS compared to the OLS approach, although the 
coefficient on logged milk price becomes negative. It is once again possible to 
examine the results from the first stage to examine strength and validity of the 
included instruments. A high value for the Shea partial R-squared and a Cragg-Donald 
Wald F-statistic suggest our instruments are not weak, and interpretations from the 
underidentification test suggest from a statistical standpoint, the model is not 
underidentified. Results from this first stage are also summarized in Table 26, and 
summaries of the instrument tests are found in Tables 27 and 28.  
Table 26. Monthly State 2SLS 1st Stage Parameter Estimates 
Dependent variable is:  
Variable  
Logged milk 
price   
   Logged state population -0.0471064 
 
 
(-0.5) 
 Logged disposable income -0.1739228 *** 
 
(-2.77) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.0345296 *** 
 
(9.77) 
 Time Trend -0.0004207 *** 
 
(-2.65) 
 Logged lagged milk production -0.0857558 *** 
 
(-3.98) 
 Logged feed price 0.4472637 *** 
 
(29.88) 
 Logged cow price 0.2319894 *** 
 
(14.10) 
 
   First-stage F-statistic 318.47 
 Partial R-squared 0.212   
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Table 27. Monthly State 2SLS Demand Underidentification Test 
Underidentification Test 
Anderson canon. Corr. LM stat = 754.426 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.0000 
 
Table 28. Monthly State 2SLS Demand Sargan Test 
Sargan Test  
Sargan stat = 2766.879 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 
 Much like the supply model, a spatial approach to account for spatial patterns 
and dependencies and instrument for milk price is implemented. Results using logged 
milk price and logged milk price plus MILC payments are summarized below. 
Table 29. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable 
Logged 
milk 
quantity   
Logged 
milk 
quantity   
Logged milk price -0.00965 
   
 
(-0.46) 
   Logged milk price plus MILC 
  
-0.017462 
 
   
(-0.77) 
 Logged disposable income -0.143407 *** -0.0136755 *** 
 
(-3.41) 
 
(3.31) 
 Logged state population 1.202646 *** 1.202385 *** 
 
(18.42) 
 
(18.42) 
 Cosine seasonal trend -0.013816 *** -0.013742 *** 
 
(-5.23) 
 
(-5.30) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.024526 *** 0.024131 *** 
 
(8.40) 
 
(8.34) 
 Trend 0.006528 
 
0.006424 
 
 
(1.72) 
 
(1.74) 
 Rho 0.34997 *** 0.351994 *** 
 
(17.00) 
 
(17.13) 
 
     R-squared 0.9855 
 
0.9855 
 # observations 3580 
 
3580 
 # variables 27   27   
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Both models exhibit similar parameter estimates. Because the supply model we 
decided to use in the previous section employs logged milk price as opposed to logged 
milk price plus MILC payments, we will focus on this model for tests on the 
instruments. Much like the supply model, utilizing spatial lags of exogenous variables 
as instruments employs more information in the model and aids in the instrumentation 
of logged milk price. The first stage results are found in Table 30.  
Results for tests on the instruments in the demand equation with spatial 
components are reported in Tables 31 and 32. Again, results suggest the model is not 
underidentified, and the instruments are not too weak to move forward.  
Table 30. Monthly State Demand SAR IV 1st Stage Parameter Estimates  
Dependent variable is:  
Variable  
Logged milk 
price   
   Logged state population 0.1944068 
 
 
(1.55) 
 Logged disposable income -0.0024171 
 
 
(-0.03) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.0344436 *** 
 
(9.76) 
 Time Trend 0.0000215 
 
 
(0.11) 
 Logged lagged milk production -0.0804759 *** 
 
(-3.72) 
 Logged feed price 0.4537807 *** 
 
(29.76) 
 Logged cow price 0.2405056 *** 
 
(14.29) 
 Lagged logged disposable income -0.3316108 
 
 
(-3.06) 
 Lagged logged state population -0.4794066 
 
 
(-2.54) 
 
   First-stage F-statistic 195.01 
 Partial R-squared 0.215   
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Table 31. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Underidentification Test 
Underidentification Test 
Anderson canon. Corr. LM stat = 766.939 
Chi-sq(2) P-val = 0.0000 
Table 32. Monthly State Demand SAR IV Sargan Test 
Sargan Test  
Sargan stat = 2767.599 
Chi-sq(1) P-val = 0.0000 
A SAR model is the correct model specification to model demand as is evident 
from the statistical tests reported. Therefore, is necessary to, again, instrument for the 
endogenous variable, milk price. All variables are logged in order to allow for state 
elasticities to be constant across states, such that percent changes are the same from 
one state to another given a shock, as opposed to the actual magnitudes of changes. 
Keep in mind, however, the spatial filter applied allows for the actual elasticities of a 
state to depend on the environments in neighboring states, thus actual elasticities from 
one state to the next can differ given what is happening in its own borders and those 
states with which borders are shared.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MODEL COMPARISONS 
Supply Models 
Due to the nature of the margin insurance programs, it is necessary to have a 
monthly model of milk supply in the United States. For the sake of robustness, models 
are estimated at various levels of spatial and temporal aggregation. The results are 
briefly summarized in the following section.   
In addition to the expected signs of the coefficients discussed in the previous 
section, particular attention is given to the elasticity of supply with respect to milk 
price, which is equal to the value of the coefficient on milk price due to the double log 
structure of the models. Previous studies determined an own-price elasticity of supply 
to be equal to 0.076 and 0.068 (Bozic, Kanter and Gould, 2012; AMS, 2007). Again, 
these values are based on national level models. State level models should have higher 
own-price elasticities of supply due to the mobility of heifers and cows than those at 
the national level, ceteris paribus. Discussion past the interpretation of parameter 
estimates of the more aggregated models, although interesting and potentially useful in 
future research on milk supply, is beyond the scope of this study.   
National Monthly Supply Models  
 The monthly national models are created utilizing the same variables as the 
state level in previous section, but without the spatial components. Model (1) is 
estimated with simple OLS, excluding the instruments. The only significant variables 
in this case are the logged lagged milk production and a portion of the seasonal 
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component. All of the signs on the coefficients are in line with theory and those 
obtained from the state level model, except for the logged cow price.  
Moving on to model (2), 2SLS is used to estimate and instrument for the 
logged milk price. Much like the state level results, the elasticity of milk price 
increases as a result of instrumentation, albeit remains insignificant. Results are quite 
similar to model (1), although the coefficient on the logged cow price switches signs 
to become negative. Note, however, this variable does not gain significance. As 
expected, the elasticity of supply is more inelastic in these two models at the national 
level than at the state level. R-squared values are quite comparable between the two 
models, as well.  
Model (3) incorporates and instruments for the value of milk price plus the 
MILC payments for the month, if applicable. Instruments used are national level data 
on population and personal disposable income per capita. The model experiences an 
increase the number of significant parameters, but loses ground on the previous 
models when it comes to goodness of fit. Again, the signs on the coefficients are in 
line with expectations. Model (4) is similar to (2), except the MILC payments are 
included as a regressor, as are dummy variables to capture the three farm bills 
throughout the sample period. Estimated parameters change dramatically in model (4), 
and they become implausible.  For example, an elasticity of supply of 6.120434 would 
suggest the milk supply in the United States is extremely inelastic, which simply is not 
the case.  
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Table 33. Monthly National Level Supply Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
 
Variable  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.031498 
 
0.082367 
   
6.120434 *** 
 
(0.87) 
 
(0.67) 
   
(3.36) 
 Logged milk price plus 
MILC 
    
0.482287 *** 
  
     
(-2.41) 
   Logged lagged milk 
production 0.997016 *** 0.994662 *** 0.971306 *** 0.052715 *** 
 
(131.07) 
 
(105.75) 
 
(66.61) 
 
(3.22) 
 Logged feed price -0.009634 
 
-0.027371 
 
-0.162951 *** -3.158427 *** 
 
(-0.59) 
 
(0.62) 
 
(2.35) 
 
(3.29) 
 Logged cow price 0.000441 
 
-0.006628 
 
-0.049307 
 
0.055609 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(1.33) 
 
(0.20) 
 Cosine seasonal trend 0.009429 
 
0.007331 
 
-0.003159 
 
-0.129078 *** 
 
(1.82) 
 
(1.03) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(2.07) 
 Sin seasonal trend 0.017786 *** 0.020386 *** 0.038528 *** 0.318039 *** 
 
(3.36) 
 
(2.53) 
 
(3.46) 
 
(3.16) 
 Cosine cyclical trend 0.000964 
 
0.002627 
 
0.013894 
 
0.156425 *** 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.40) 
 
(1.62) 
 
(2.39) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.002976 
 
-0.009855 
 
-0.04917 *** -0.4642 *** 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(2.25) 
 
(3.14) 
 Dummy variable: 1996 Farm Bill 
     
-0.964801 *** 
       
(2.90) 
 Dummy Variable: 2002 Farm Bill 
     
-0.888136 *** 
       
(2.97) 
 MILC payments 
      
0.776749 *** 
       
(3.21) 
 
         R-squared 0.6772 
 
0.6734 
 
0.4989 
 
-24.7264 
 Adjusted R-sq 0.6639 
 
0.6601 
 
0.4784 
 
-26.2958 
 # observations 179 
 
179 
 
179 
 
179 
 # variables 8  8  8  11 
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State Annual Supply Models 
Annual state models are summarized in Table 34, and are constructed in very 
similar fashion to the monthly models. The main exception is the exclusion of the 
seasonal sinusoidal wave variables. These are included in the monthly models to 
capture seasonality within a year, but unnecessary when looking at annual data.  
Again, model (1) is a SAR model without instrumentation, and despite a high 
goodness of fit measure, the parameters do not have what we expect in terms of signs 
on the coefficients. For example, the logged milk price in (1) has a negative 
coefficient, albeit insignificant. The same is also true for the logged feed and logged 
cow prices. Looking at model (2), the logged milk price is instrumented with the 
population and disposable income variables, and the coefficients fall closer into line 
with what we expect. Despite this, only logged lagged milk production and one of the 
variables used to capture the cyclical trend are statistically significant.  
Model (3) is constructed in similar fashion to (2), except the value of the MILC 
payment added to the milk price is an average of all MILC payments per 
hundredweight over the course of the calendar year. Results are very similar to those 
in found in (2) in terms of both signs of the coefficients, magnitude of the coefficients, 
and statistical significance. Finally, model (4) is and extension of (2) to include the 
dummy variables for Farm Bills and MILC payments, as well. The parameter for 
logged feed price switches to positive in (4), which contradicts expectations. Overall, 
although these models have high R-squared values and seemingly plausible supply 
elasticities, they lack significance in regards to these elasticities and produce negative 
spatial weight matrix parameters. 
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Table 34. Annual State Level Supply Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
 
Variable  
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production 
 
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged 
milk 
production   
Logged milk price -0.011087 
 
0.087534   
  
0.033123 
 
 
(0.52) 
 
(1.30) 
   
(0.48) 
 Logged milk price plus 
MILC 
    
0.090823 
   
     
(1.32) 
   Logged lagged milk 
production 0.935242 *** 0.936561 *** 0.936322 *** 0.938781 *** 
 
(61.67) 
 
(61.80) 
 
(61.82) 
 
(63.24) 
 Logged feed price 0.017047 
 
-0.019941 
 
-0.020381 
 
0.018045 
 
 
(1.65) 
 
(-0.76) 
 
(-0.78) 
 
(0.57) 
 Logged cow price 0.011433 
 
0.004001 
 
0.003137 
 
-0.014258 
 
 
(0.97) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(-0.87) 
 Cosine cyclical trend -0.010544 *** -0.019275 *** -0.017599 *** -0.018365 *** 
 
(-3.40) 
 
(-2.99) 
 
(-3.37) 
 
(-4.31) 
 Sin cyclical trend 0.003799 
 
-0.004745 
 
-0.003158 
 
-0.001137 
 
 
(1.22) 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(-0.60) 
 
(-0.25) 
 Rho -0.024984 
 
-0.014979 
 
-0.015987 
 
-0.026964 
 
 
(-0.83) 
 
(-0.49) 
 
(-0.52) 
 
(-0.89) 
 Dummy variable: 1996 Farm Bill 
     
0.010499 
 
       
(0.92) 
 Dummy Variable: 2002 Farm Bill 
     
0.018982 *** 
       
(2.51) 
 MILC payments 
      
-0.00889 
 
       
(0.82) 
 
         R-squared 0.9993 
 
0.9993 
 
0.9993 
 
0.9994 
 # observations 300 
 
300 
 
300 
 
300 
 # variables 27  27  27  30  
 
National Annual Supply Models 
 Finally, a similar approach is taken with annual national data as the approaches 
described for the annual state data. Once again, results are not as promising as the 
results derived from the monthly state level models. Model (1) is an OLS estimations 
without the use of instruments. Coefficients on both feed and logged lagged milk 
production are statistically significant, but the rest of the parameters are not. Goodness 
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of fit is very high for this model, due primarily to the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor 
Models (2) and (3) use 2SLS to instruments for logged milk price and the 
logged value of milk price and MILC payments, respectively. The parameter estimates 
from these two models, although not identical, are similar. Both lose significance in 
the logged feed price when compared to (1), and both imply milk supply in the United 
States is elastic. Although the signs for the coefficients on the logged feed and logged 
cow prices are negative for (2) and (3), they are statistically insignificant and not of 
much use for the purposes of this study.  
Table 35. Annual National Level Supply Parameter Estimates 
 
Dependent variable is: 
Variable  
(1)   (2)   (3)   
Logged milk 
production 
 
Logged milk 
production 
 
Logged milk 
production   
Logged milk price 0.007744   1.018221     
 
 
(1.30) 
 
(0.74) 
   Logged milk price plus MILC 
    
1.189942 
 
     
(0.87) 
 Logged lagged milk production 0.999876 *** 0.925074 *** 0.912506 *** 
 
(939.47) 
 
(7.99) 
 
(8.10) 
 Logged feed price -0.005968 *** -0.33413 
 
-0.381206 
 
 
(-2.56) 
 
(-0.74) 
 
(-0.87) 
 Logged cow price 0.000879 
 
-0.031222 
 
-0.043443 
 
 
(0.25) 
 
(-0.16) 
 
(-0.23) 
 Cosine cyclical trend -0.001523 
 
-0.093619 
 
-0.082603 
 
 
(-1.78) 
 
(-0.72) 
 
(-0.83) 
 Sin cyclical trend -0.000919 
 
-0.093121 
 
-0.083607 
 
 
(-1.05) 
 
(-0.71) 
 
(-0.82) 
 
       R-squared 0.9996 
 
-0.1687 
 
0.0111 
 Adjusted R-sq 0.9994 
 
-0.818 
 
-0.5383 
 # observations 15 
 
15 
 
15 
 # variables 6  6  6  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SIMULATIONS 
Data is manipulated to represent logged values in order to impose similar 
coefficients, and as a result, similar elasticities across states in both the SAR supply 
and demand models. The simulation requires the supply and demand system to be 
solved for state level prices, followed by a calibration of the intercepts and error terms 
in these models to generate milk futures prices with volatility similar to those in the 
futures markets. After, correlated corn, soybean, soybean meal, and live cattle futures 
are generated based upon these milk prices. From state level, commodity-specific 
characteristic regressions on futures prices, state level input prices are generated. From 
the supply and demand models described in the previous section, state level prices and 
quantities are simulated, which aggregate to the national level to be relevant for 
margin insurance policy discussions. This is believed to be the first study of its kind to 
simultaneously simulate a spatial supply and demand system.   
Solving the System 
We observe market equilibriums where quantity supplied and quantity 
demanded meet to simultaneously determine equilibrium price, thus it is possible to 
utilize the supply and demand models to solve for state level milk price. For example, 
it is known: 
 
 In the demand model above,  is the logged milk production in state i during 
time period t, I is a 20x20 identity matrix,  is the spatial lag parameter, W is a 20x20 
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spatial weight matrix, P is the logged state level milk price, is the estimated 
elasticity of demand with respect to milk price, is a Nx25 matrix of regressors 
including state dummy variables, logged state level disposable income, logged state 
population, two variables to capture seasonality, and a logged trend value.  is a 
25x1 vector of estimated coefficients obtained from the SAR panel regression after 
instrumenting for logged milk price in the first step, and  is the error term.  
 Similarly, the supply model for each period can be summarized as the 
following: 
 
In the supply model,  is the logged milk production in state i during time 
period t, I is a 20x20 identity matrix,  is the spatial lag parameter, W is a 20x20 
spatial weight matrix, P is the logged state level milk price,  is the coefficient on 
milk price. This can also be interpreted as the estimated elasticity of supply with 
respect to milk price. The variable  is an Nx27 matrix of explanatory exogenous 
variables, including state dummy variables for all 20 states, lagged logged milk 
production, logged feed cost, logged cow slaughter price, two variables to capture 
seasonality within a calendar year, and two variables to capture the cyclical nature of 
milk production and prices that occurs over the course of 3 years. Finally,  is the 
error term. 
 Equipped with both a supply and a demand model, it is possible to solve for 
the solution of the system in order to simulate. To simulate forward, calculations to 
determine equilibrium prices and quantities must be made for each period we wish to 
simulate. A lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor, which means once 
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the system is solved for a given time period, the dependent variable must be plugged 
in as a regressor in the next period. To begin, it is necessary to note: 
 
The state and national level market-clearing condition that quantity demanded 
must equal quantity supplied indicates market equilibrium, at which point price is 
discovered. Therefore, it is possible to solve the above equations for state level 
equilibrium price, P*, as follows:  
 
 This is the solution to our state level system of supply and demand. The 
simulation approach conducted herein necessitates a number of steps to ensure future 
price paths are plausible, correlation among these price paths exists, and prices and 
quantities aggregate up to the national level to produce meaningful results in light of 
the margin insurance program(s). 
To continue moving toward simulations, it is first necessary to run 
characteristic regressions for the various prices included in the supply and demand 
models. These regressions allows us to back out state level prices once we obtain 
futures prices for given commodities in later steps. First, it is necessary to regress milk 
futures on U.S. all-milk price and lagged future values: 
 
In this case, a simple OLS regression is run of logged Class III milk futures 
prices, or  on , which includes a constant, lagged logged Class III milk 
futures prices, and the monthly U.S. all-milk price.  
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The logged state level cow slaughter prices, or y, are regressed using a SAR 
panel method on X, which includes state dummy variables, lagged logged state level 
cow slaughter prices, logged live cattle future price, and logged state level milk price. 
Again, I is a 20x20 identity matrix,  is the estimated spatial lag parameter, and W is 
the 20x20 weight matrix.  
 
As a result, the is able to be pre-generated for utilization in 
later steps to recover state prices in the spatial framework. After live cattle futures 
prices and state level milk prices are obtained, state level cow slaughter prices are 
easily recovered.  
Similarly, a SAR panel regression is run for logged state level corn price, in 
this case y, on X, which includes state dummy variables, lagged logged state level corn 
price, and logged corn futures price. The matrices I and W are the same as before, 
is the vector of coefficient obtained from the regression, and  is the vector 
of residuals.  
 
The same SAR process is followed for soybeans such that y is logged state 
level soybean prices, the matrix X contains state dummy variables, lagged logged state 
level soybean prices, and futures soybean prices. Again, the is pre-
generated for later use.  
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A SAR panel method is utilized for logged state level alfalfa price, as well, 
although regressors in this case differ a bit due to the lack of a futures market for 
alfalfa hay. Instead, y includes state level alfalfa hay prices, whereas X includes state 
level dummy variables, lagged logged state level alfalfa hay price, and logged futures 
corn prices.  
 
Finally, the logged state level feed prices are regressed on the lagged logged 
state level feed price, logged state level corn price, logged state level soybean price, 
and logged state level alfalfa hay price in a SAR panel regression framework.  
 
National level corn, soybean meal, and alfalfa hay prices are estimated 
utilizing OLS regressions of logged national cash prices on lagged logged national 
cash prices and logged futures prices of corn, soybean meal, and corn, respectively.  
In all instances to follow, it is first necessary to simulate future price paths of 
milk futures. Equipped with milk futures prices, it is possible to generate correlated 
uniform random variables for the other futures contracts and draw out of their price 
paths, described below. After these futures prices are obtained, it is possible to plug 
their values into the equations above to recover state level prices utilizing the 
estimated coefficients from the SAR regressions and national prices utilizing the 
estimated parameters from the OLS regressions.  
Calibrating Coefficients   
To begin, it is necessary to calibrate for initial milk price by state. This is 
accomplished by setting the initial price and quantities equal to the last values in the 
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dataset, or by setting them to current market values. After this step is completed, it is 
necessary to “burn-in” the model to obtain beta shifts such that we minimize the 
residual at the starting period between the predicted value and the actual value. 
Otherwise, the first iteration in the simulation will jump well above or below plausible 
values. It is necessary to account for discrepancies in initial actual values versus initial 
predicated values by “burning-in” these beta shifters with 36 iterations, as one 
complete cycle in the supply model lasts 3 years, or 36 months. The objective here is 
to minimize the following:  
 
In the above objective equation, state_sim is the simulated state level milk 
price at the end of the 36 iterations, state_p is the actual state level milk price at this 
time, US_p is the actual U.S. all-milk price, US_sim is the resulting U.S. all-milk price 
from the simulation, log_sim_state_q is the logged value of the simulated state level 
milk production, and log_state_q is the logged value of actual state milk production, 
all at the end of the burn-in period. Changing the factor by which the state level 
intercepts are multiplied minimizes this sum. The vectors betaS and betaD contain 
supply and demand coefficients, respectively. Multiplying the 20 state level fixed 
effects contained in each by a factor yields the following: 
 
 
It is possible to minimize the aforementioned objective function by changing 
the factor by which we shift the coefficients state fixed effects. Because all data is in 
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logged form, these optimal levels of the elements calibBeta, when added to the 
existing intercepts allow for the state level intercepts to be shifted up or down to more 
accurately accommodate and achieve equilibrium within the initial system with 
current quantities and prices before future price paths are created to disrupt the system. 
These new shifted intercepts are utilized throughout the rest of the analysis to avoid 
large jumps in estimates away from initial values, particularly in the first iteration of 
the system. These coefficients are utilized to simulate one path for the 36 months 
leading up to the initial period of the projected simulation, which produces the initial 
calibrated quantity values such that: 
 
 In the above equation,  and  are calibrated with the state fixed effects 
found in the previous step. Because we know that: 
 
 It is possible to obtain the quantity supplied in time period 36, and allow for 
this value to be the lagged quantity value for the simulations moving forward. 
Utilizing the calibrated coefficients, we obtain  and  , and can generate the 
standard deviations of each. It is also necessary to create 20x20 correlation matrices of 
state residuals the supply and demand models. 
 From the supply and demand models, we obtain both state level price as well 
as quantity. Because we know the U.S. all-milk price is a weighted average of milk 
produced throughout the nation, it is possible to obtain an estimate of U.S. all-milk 
price from the models by multiplying each state’s output by price, summing together, 
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and dividing by total milk production. As a result of this U.S. all-milk price, and 
because we know the lagged value of Class III milk futures, it is possible to obtain an 
estimate of the simulated Class III milk futures price by pugging these values into the 
milk futures characteristic regression described above.  
Calibrating System Volatility  
In order to construct a plausible system, the milk futures prices produced from 
the interacting supply and demand models must have the same properties, or risk, as 
those futures contracts in the actual marketplace. The next calibration which must take 
place is one such that the standard deviation of predicted milk futures prices is equal to 
that which we observe in the options market. That is, we must calibrate our system by 
changing the standard deviation on the errors from the supply and demand models in 
order to produce milk futures price paths that exhibit volatility similarly to the actual 
volatility of milk futures prices. The objective of obtaining simulated milk futures 
price paths with volatility equal to 0.22 and ~N(0,1)  is achieved by optimizing the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the supply and demand. After the system is 
correctly calibrated, it is possible to begin simulating future price paths and scenarios. 
First, let us examine the nature of futures price paths. Here, we utilize a Euler 
approximation for a random walk. The Euler method indicates for a price path x,  
 
where  is the time step, in our case 1/12 because of the monthly data,  is the 
implied volatility, and  is ~N(0,1). The value of  for a given commodity is obtained 
using Black-Scholes to recover the annualized implied volatility. Because all data is in 
logs, it is possible to rewrite this as: 
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This is useful for our purposes that the error term is normally distributed, as it can be 
leveraged when generating correlated random variables for the other prices in the 
analysis. 
Initial values for milk, corn, soybean, soybean meal, and live cattle futures are 
set to the ending values of the data, and initial state level cash prices for corn, soybean, 
cow slaughter, alfalfa hay, and feed are also set. These serve as the  portion of the 
equation above when attempting to calculate the . 
Volatilities for the futures contracts are obtained using Black-Scholes and 
initialized. Furthermore, a 5x5 correlation matrix between historical logged futures 
prices for milk, corn, soybean, soybean meal, and live cattle prices is produced. A 
correlation matrix of logged historical futures prices is created between milk, corn, 
soybean, soybean meal, and live cattle futures, with logged milk futures in the first 
column.  
 By changing the standard deviations of  and  in the supply and demand 
models, respectively, different Class III milk futures prices are obtained. The objective 
is to find the optimal standard deviations of  and  such that milk futures prices are 
obtained with volatility equal to the standard deviation of milk futures prices in the 
futures market, or 0.22. it is known that ~N(0,1). These calibrated supply and 
demand standard deviations are obtained through an optimization procedure and are 
utilized form this point forward. 
Simulating Runs 
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Equipped with calibrated state intercepts and supply and demand model 
volatilities, which in turn produce plausible milk futures prices, it is possible to 
simulate many runs and evaluate the future states of the world. First, initial futures 
prices are set. Correlated uniform random variables for all futures contracts are 
generated based upon historical correlations utilizing the Iman-Conover method. 
After, correlated supply and demand residuals  and  are generated in 20x20 block 
matrices. These variables are distributed normally with mean zero and standard 
deviation equal to the optimal levels found in the above calibration.  
The iterations, or months, are looped through to generate one path. From this 
path, state price and quantities are obtained, which lead to the recovery of the U.S. all-
milk price. As a result of the previous characteristic regression, and equipped with the 
lagged value of milk futures, the Class III milk futures price is obtained. Because we 
know the following from the Euler technique: 
 
From the equation above, it is possible to recover , or the implied epsilon. 
Because ~N(0,1), it is possible to pass the implied  through a normal CDF. The 
resulting value becomes the first column for a Cholesky decomposition. Taking the 
previously generated correlated uniform random variables from the Iman-Conover 
method, it is possible to obtain values of  for all futures contract price paths. 
Equipped with these values, coupled with initial price values, implied volatilities from 
the futures markets, and a constant time step, it is possible to generate price paths for 
the corn, soybean, soybean meal, and live cattle futures with the Euler method.  
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 From the generated price paths, these values are plugged back into the 
characteristic regressions from the beginning of the simulation process to recover state 
level corn, soybean, alfalfa, and cow slaughter prices, as well as national level corn, 
soybean meal, and alfalfa prices. Equipped with these values for the number of 
iterations of each simulation, it is possible to utilize the estimated model parameters 
from above to generate state milk supply and demand. Relationships between milk, 
cow slaughter, and feed component prices are maintained with historically correct 
correlations to one another, although the state level errors allow for the exact basis in 
each instance to vary slightly. In addition, the variables to capture seasonal and 
cyclical effects are pre-generated. Demand is assumed to be constant, except for the 
trend and seasonal components.  
Simulation Considerations 
During the simulations, it is necessary to collect data not only on prices and 
quantities, but also to collect data for use in estimating the efficacy of the policy 
instruments based upon participation rates in various regions of the country. Chief 
among these considerations are welfare effects and expected payments. Both 
consumer and producer surplus are calculated for each simulation.  Consumer surplus 
is estimated by integrating the area under the demand curve between a maximum price 
and the equilibrium price, or psim, which is different between different states. 
Consumer surplus is calculated by integrating over a number s=0:1 by doing change of 
variables such that: 
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In the equation above, pmax is set to a very high number, such as 100, and 
psim is the logged price because demand is very inelastic in the short run. The demand 
equation must be multiplied by (pmax-exp(psim)) to obtain consumer surplus. After 
consumer surplus is obtained in simulations without supply controls, the calculations 
are repeated in the event of supply controls to obtain consumer welfare changes as a 
result of DMSP.   
Producer surplus for a given scenario is the area between the equilibrium price, 
and supply curve where quantity is equal to zero. Again, producer surplus is calculated 
by integrating over a number s=0:1. After, it is necessary to conduct change of 
variables in order to integrate from 0 percent to 100 percent of the equilibrium price, 
such that Ultimately, it is necessary to multiply the supply equation by the exp(psim) 
and sum across all iterations to obtain producer surplus resulting from the integral 
from zero to psim.  
It is important to note that for the consumer and producer surplus calculations, 
the sheer magnitude of these calculations are less important than the change in values 
from one scenario to the next. By evaluating the relative changes in producer and 
consumer surplus from differing levels of participation in various programs, it is 
possible to examine the sources of deadweight loss or welfare gain for the economy at 
large.  
For the DFA and the 2014 Farm Bill, expected payments are relatively 
straightforward, as simulated price paths are generated and payments are based upon 
the margins in each 2 month block from the simulations. For the DSA, however, 
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expected payments are more complex due to the importance of participation in the 
program and its mandatory supply controls.  
Margins are calculated in the simulation, and if necessary, supply controls kick 
in, but only directly restrict the production for those participation in the program. This 
is important because of the lagged dependent variable in the supply model, thus the 
supply control effects reverberate in the system. Provisions of S. 954 are included 
directly into the simulation procedure. Because of the nature of the models at 
hand,price and quantity effects at the state and national levels as a result of these 
controls are collected and analyzed. In addition, it is possible to examine expected 
payments at different coverage levels. After comparing these expected payments to the 
static premiums in the 2014 Farm Bill, government loss ratios are estimated.  
 87 
CHAPTER 7 
 
RESULTS 
 Coupled with the novel approach to modeling milk supply and demand, as well 
as the new methods developed for simulating a spatial supply and demand system 
described in the previous section, a multitude of results may be gleaned. Particular 
attention is paid to three main takeaways: the dollar impact of supply controls in terms 
of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and milk price, expected indemnities at the 
various levels of coverage available, and the loss ratios facing the government at each 
of these coverage thresholds given static premium rates. When examining the effect of 
supply controls on the state and national markets, the assumption is made that 100 
percent of the milk produced in the U.S. is enrolled in the program and, as a result, 
subject to supply controls.  
Impact of Supply Controls 
 A priori, we expect supply controls to increase the U.S. all-milk price because 
of its production restricting provisions and to increase producer surplus at the expense 
of consumer surplus and the economy at large. Again, the claim that supply control 
impact is trivial on the milk market does not seem to be credible—either the supply 
controls have an effect and it can be measured, or there would not have been a point in 
including them in the DSA to begin with.  
In order to estimate the impact of supply controls as outlined in the DSA and 
put a dollar value on this shift in wealth from consumers to producers, it is necessary 
to run a baseline scenario in the simulation without policy layered on top. A 48-month 
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simulation is conducted beginning with the end of our data set, December 2012, as the 
starting values and calibrated to produce futures volatilities equal to those in the 
options markets as traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. This simulation is 
repeated 1000 times and results are compiled and analyzed. 
When simulated for 4 years without supply controls in place, the average 
monthly U.S. all-milk price is $22.18/cwt., and milk production is 17,366,064,073 
pounds per month. As a result, the average producer revenue from milk sales across all 
simulations and iterations is equal to $3,838,837,892.20/month. Summing the values 
of consumer surplus and producer surplus provide a total welfare equal to 
approximately $23,324,454,408.50 per month.  
 The assumption is made that all dairy producers in the U.S. participate in a 
margin insurance program that requires adherence to supply controls similar to those 
found in the DSA. The simulation is run again, but this time the national margin is 
calculated after each month. If the margin for a single month is below $4.00 or for a 
consecutive two-month period is below $6.00, as outlined in S. 954, reductions in 
production during the following month are made. After margins rise above threshold 
values, milk production is allowed to continue along unabated until the next period of 
low margins. The simulation is run over the same 4-year period as the baseline 
scenario with the same initial starting values and calibrated to the same volatilities as 
the baseline scenario, but 100% of the milk produced in the U.S. is subject to the 
supply controls.  Presumably, changes that occur small on the surface in terms of price 
or quantity on a monthly basis will lead to large changes in welfare due to the size of 
the U.S. milk market.  
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After 1000 simulations, results are compiled and expected prices and quantities 
are gathered. The U.S. all-milk price increases by $0.77 to $22.95/cwt. Likewise, and 
as expected, milk production decreases by nearly 40 million pounds per month. 
Because of the inelasticity of milk supply and demand, overall producer revenue from 
milk sales actually increases by $124,241,272.68 per month. Producer surplus 
increases by $30,080,614 per month, while consumer surplus decreases by over $134B 
per month when compared to the baseline without supply controls. Overall, supply 
controls with 100% producer participation costs the U.S. economy $104,596,465 per 
month over the course of the next 4 years in deadweight loss. Results are summarized 
below. 
Table 36. Welfare Analysis-Simulation Results (Monthly Expected Values) 
  No Supply Controls 100% Participation Difference 
CS  $20,189,490,000.40   $20,054,812,920.39   $(134,677,080.01) 
PS  $3,134,964,408.10   $3,165,045,022.64   $30,080,614.54  
Rev  $3,838,837,892.20   $3,963,079,164.88   $124,241,272.68  
US-Q 
(Pounds)  17,366,064,073.67   17,325,186,527.14   (40,877,546.52) 
US-P($/cwt.)  $22.18   $22.95   $0.77  
Total Welfare  $23,324,454,408.50   $23,219,857,943.02   $(104,596,465.48) 
  
Certainly producer participation decisions drive these conclusions, and future 
research utilizing the spatial supply and demand system developed in this study can be 
utilized to analyze spatial impacts of regional participation levels, and what this means 
on a national scale. When looking at the state level, interesting patterns emerge when 
examining state level prices and quantities. The monthly expected value for the U.S. 
all-milk price increases by 3.472% with the introduction of supply controls.  
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Table 37 compiles the simulated expected state level milk prices both without 
supply controls and with supply controls and 100% participation over the same four y 
ear period.  In addition to the simulated expected milk prices, the 10th and 90th 
percentile for all 20 states.  
Table 37. Expected State Level Monthly Milk Price ($/cwt.) 
  No Supply Controls 100% Participation 
State 
10th 
Percentile  
Expected 
Value 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile  
Expected 
Value 
90th 
Percentile 
AZ $20.36 $22.78 $25.43 $20.52 $23.54 $26.96 
CA $18.66 $20.91 $23.41 $18.86 $21.62 $24.65 
FL $23.97 $26.88 $30.05 $24.19 $27.75 $31.68 
ID $19.62 $21.98 $24.52 $19.75 $22.75 $25.98 
IL $21.11 $23.65 $26.41 $21.37 $24.48 $28.06 
IN $19.81 $22.19 $24.78 $19.98 $22.95 $26.40 
IA $19.65 $22.01 $24.60 $19.85 $22.79 $26.15 
MI $19.44 $21.73 $24.26 $19.65 $22.50 $25.82 
MN $18.56 $20.73 $23.19 $18.79 $21.48 $24.48 
MO $20.27 $22.74 $25.45 $20.57 $23.50 $26.91 
NM $19.97 $22.34 $24.96 $20.15 $23.10 $26.48 
NY $21.32 $23.85 $26.70 $21.45 $24.68 $28.25 
OH $20.88 $23.35 $26.17 $21.09 $24.18 $27.68 
PA $23.01 $25.80 $28.89 $23.29 $26.70 $30.53 
TX $20.22 $22.66 $25.32 $20.41 $23.42 $26.79 
VT $21.92 $24.50 $27.39 $22.05 $25.37 $28.97 
VA $23.24 $26.03 $29.16 $23.44 $26.93 $30.84 
WA $21.80 $24.37 $27.25 $22.06 $25.22 $28.72 
WI $18.63 $20.82 $23.32 $18.80 $21.56 $24.66 
OTHER $19.65 $21.98 $24.59 $19.80 $22.74 $26.08 
  
 As we expect, supply controls result in higher milk prices in all states with 
100% participation. In addition, the same analysis can be done in terms of milk 
production. Table 38 compiles the simulated expected milk production in each state 
without and with supply controls, respectively. In addition to the mean value, the 10th
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Table 38. Expected State Level Monthly Milk Production (lbs.) 
  No Supply Controls 100% Participation 
State 10th Percentile  Expected Value 90th Percentile 10th Percentile  
Expected 
Value 90th Percentile 
AZ  382,161,322   385,532,807   388,766,440   380,659,195   384,657,949   388,382,756  
CA  3,482,435,662   3,514,865,483   3,545,948,186   3,470,932,752   3,506,737,471   3,541,377,831  
FL  197,692,088   199,437,559   201,129,581   196,943,657   198,990,892   200,959,364  
ID  1,140,337,826   1,151,193,469   1,162,904,650   1,136,876,586   1,148,474,707   1,159,975,843  
IL  173,213,128   174,701,000   176,268,698   172,452,220   174,287,341   175,971,711  
IN  325,220,330   328,143,005   331,291,060   323,818,319   327,374,102   330,844,724  
IA  397,382,715   400,883,452   404,765,664   395,914,586   399,925,186   404,139,455  
MI  769,731,158   776,860,860   784,805,489   767,094,049   775,007,363   783,034,130  
MN  807,704,163   815,362,424   822,994,500   805,279,532   813,388,723   821,189,351  
MO  116,986,672   117,987,375   119,059,610   116,474,284   117,714,718   118,855,816  
NM  687,367,877   693,574,674   700,091,506   685,085,995   691,966,764   698,479,682  
NY  1,141,336,737   1,151,963,284   1,163,124,977   1,137,702,997   1,149,234,252   1,160,796,558  
OH  473,379,004   477,666,736   482,401,604   471,662,443   476,530,029   481,371,967  
PA  912,135,703   920,216,655   928,844,641   908,691,214   918,032,177   926,879,028  
TX  821,380,128   828,662,113   836,282,074   818,380,861   826,779,486   835,820,399  
VT  222,694,450   224,764,496   226,908,099   222,008,834   224,232,015   226,397,462  
VA  150,275,261   151,621,039   153,059,217   149,675,016   151,265,684   152,783,577  
WA  525,015,464   530,101,987   534,975,504   523,407,326   528,841,621   533,644,723  
WI  2,417,497,579   2,440,304,698   2,465,220,715   2,410,215,225   2,434,398,724   2,459,113,588  
OTHER  2,063,639,350   2,082,220,959   2,101,936,487   2,056,205,138   2,077,347,325   2,098,515,649  
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and 90th percentiles are reported, as well. It is easy to see the increases in state level 
milk prices when supply controls are introduced are driven by marked decreases in 
milk production, adding up to a 0.235% decrease in national output.  
Expected Indemnities 
 Given the simulations conducted, expected margins may be computed over the 
course of the same 4-year period and expected payments under different coverage 
levels may be computed. After price paths of milk and feed component prices are 
simulated, 2-month margins may be calculated. From these 2-month margins, the 
margin shortfalls in relation to coverage thresholds may be calculated and analyzed. 
These margin thresholds are summarized below in Table 39, where annual expected 
payments per hundredweight of milk produced are reported at each coverage level, as 
well as the 10th and 90th percentiles for both no supply controls as well as 100% 
participation in supply controls.  
Table 39. Expected Annual National Margin Shortfalls ($/cwt/year)  
  No Supply Controls 100% Participation 
Coverage 
Level 
10th 
Percentile 
Expected 
Value 
90th 
Percentile 
10th 
Percentile 
Expected 
Value 
90th 
Percentile 
$4.00 $0.0000 $0.1607 $0.3757 $0.0000 $0.0032 $0.0000 
$4.50 $0.0000 $0.2342 $0.6250 $0.0000 $0.0094 $0.0000 
$5.00 $0.0000 $0.3390 $0.9524 $0.0000 $0.0246 $0.0700 
$5.50 $0.0000 $0.4890 $1.3279 $0.0000 $0.0599 $0.2045 
$6.00 $0.0000 $0.7006 $1.7947 $0.0000 $0.1338 $0.3833 
$6.50 $0.0000 $0.9954 $2.3547 $0.0000 $0.2722 $0.6819 
$7.00 $0.0936 $1.4040 $3.1566 $0.0332 $0.5096 $1.1241 
$7.50 $0.3306 $1.9551 $4.0500 $0.2266 $0.8869 $1.7229 
$8.00 $0.7276 $2.6809 $5.2709 $0.5514 $1.4427 $2.5569 
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After compiling the annual margin shortfalls at each coverage level, it is 
possible to begin to calculate the expected government loss ratios under each of the 
proposals as well as the 2014 Farm Bill, because premium rates are static as outlined 
in the legislation. Expected government loss ratios are calculated by dividing expected 
payments to producers by premiums paid by producers. Because premium rates differ 
between producers with bases below 4,000,000 pounds of production and those with 
greater than 4,000,000 pounds, loss ratios for each of these premium rates are 
included. This analysis is conducted for provisions as outlined in DFA (Table 40). 
After, an approach to compare DFA and DSA side-by-side is conducted to analyze 
expected government loss ratios for DSA premiums under constant volatility; that is, 
examine loss ratios in a market without supply controls but with the same premiums as 
found in DSA. DSA loss ratios are also computed for the market in which there exists 
100% participation in the supply control program. Finally, expected government loss 
ratios are computed for the actual program as outlined in the 2014 Farm Bill. 
Table 40. DFA Expected Government Loss Ratios  
Coverage 
Threshold 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production>4 
million 
pounds 
Expected 
Indemnities 
($/cwt./yr.) 
Loss Ratio 
(<4 million 
pounds) 
Loss Ratio 
(>4 
million 
pounds) 
$4.00  None $0.030 0.16071 
 
5.36 
$4.50  $0.010 $0.045 0.23416 23.42 5.20 
$5.00  $0.020 $0.066 0.33897 16.95 5.14 
$5.50  $0.035 $0.110 0.48904 13.97 4.45 
$6.00  $0.045 $0.185 0.70058 15.57 3.79 
$6.50  $0.090 $0.290 0.99536 11.06 3.43 
$7.00  $0.180 $0.380 1.40399 7.80 3.69 
$7.50  $0.600 $0.830 1.95508 3.26 2.36 
$8.00  $0.950 $1.060 2.68095 2.82 2.53 
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 Government loss ratios are in line with previous studies, with government loss 
ratios at much higher levels for smaller farms compared to larger farms, Again, it is 
unsurprising the DFA was favored by those states dominated by smaller producers in 
the Northeast and Midwest as opposed to those state with a higher prevalence of 
Western-style dairy farms.  
Table 41. DSA with Constant Volatility Expected Government Loss Ratios 
Coverage 
Threshold 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production>4 
million 
pounds 
Expected 
Indemnities 
($/cwt./yr.) 
Loss Ratio 
(<4 million 
pounds) 
Loss Ratio 
(>4 
million 
pounds) 
$4.00  None None 0.16071 
  $4.50  $0.010 $0.020 0.23416 23.42 11.71 
$5.00  $0.020 $0.040 0.33897 16.95 8.47 
$5.50  $0.035 $0.100 0.48904 13.97 4.89 
$6.00  $0.045 $0.150 0.70058 15.57 4.67 
$6.50  $0.090 $0.290 0.99536 11.06 3.43 
$7.00  $0.400 $0.630 1.40399 3.51 2.23 
$7.50  $0.600 $0.830 1.95508 3.26 2.36 
$8.00  $0.950 $1.060 2.68095 2.82 2.53 
 
 Assuming constant volatility, Table 41 reports loss ratios under DSA. While 
loss ratios are relatively comparable for the small farms, loss ratios tend to exhibit 
greater variability for larger farms when compared to the DFA. In particular, at lower 
levels of coverage, large farms receive a proportionally larger payment in relation to 
their premium than under DFA, assuming constant volatility. These results are 
summarized in Table 42. It is clear that because the industry was set-up to have 100% 
producer participation in this scenario and all-milk produced adhered to the provisions 
included in the supply control legislation, expected government loss ratios were able 
to be minimized compared to the previous two programs. In this special instance, 
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supply controls were able to lower government costs, but 100% participation in such a 
program is a lofty and relatively unrealistic goal. As stated before, this apparent 
savings in indemnities paid by the government comes at the cost of social welfare. 
Table 42. DSA Expected Government Loss Ratios 
Coverage 
Threshold 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production>4 
million 
pounds 
Expected 
Indemnities 
($/cwt./yr.) 
Loss Ratio 
(<4 
million 
pounds) 
Loss Ratio 
(>4 
million 
pounds) 
$4.00  None None 0.00319 
  $4.50  $0.010 $0.020 0.00939 0.94 0.47 
$5.00  $0.020 $0.040 0.02464 1.23 0.62 
$5.50  $0.035 $0.100 0.05987 1.71 0.60 
$6.00  $0.045 $0.150 0.13382 2.97 0.89 
$6.50  $0.090 $0.290 0.27218 3.02 0.94 
$7.00  $0.400 $0.630 0.50963 1.27 0.81 
$7.50  $0.600 $0.830 0.88686 1.48 1.07 
$8.00  $0.950 $1.060 1.44267 1.52 1.36 
 
 Table 43 below focuses on the expected government loss ratios simulated with 
the 2014 Farm Bill premium rates and a dairy industry without supply controls.  
Table 43. 2014 Farm Bill Expected Government Loss Ratios 
Coverage 
Threshold 
1st 4 
million 
pounds 
Production>4 
million 
pounds 
Expected 
Indemnities 
($/cwt./yr.) 
Loss Ratio 
(<4 
million 
pounds) 
Loss Ratio 
(>4 
million 
pounds) 
$4.00  None None 0.16071 
  $4.50  $0.010 $0.020 0.23416 23.42 11.71 
$5.00  $0.025 $0.040 0.33897 13.56 8.47 
$5.50  $0.040 $0.100 0.48904 12.23 4.89 
$6.00  $0.055 $0.155 0.70058 12.74 4.52 
$6.50  $0.090 $0.290 0.99536 11.06 3.43 
$7.00  $0.217 $0.830 1.40399 6.47 1.69 
$7.50  $0.300 $1.060 1.95508 6.52 1.84 
$8.00  $0.475 $1.360 2.68095 5.64 1.97 
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 Results from all four scenarios described above are summarized below in 
Tables 44 and 45. First, results for small farms, or those with production less than 4 
million pounds per year, are summarized. After, larger farms, or farms with greater 
than 4 million pounds of annual production, are summarized.  
Table 44. Expected Government Loss Ratios, Small Farms  
 Coverage 
Threshold  DFA 
DSA, constant 
volatility DSA 
2014 Farm 
Bill 
$4.00  - - - - 
$4.50  23.42 23.42 0.94 23.42 
$5.00  16.95 16.95 1.23 13.56 
$5.50  13.97 13.97 1.71 12.23 
$6.00  15.57 15.57 2.97 12.74 
$6.50  11.06 11.06 3.02 11.06 
$7.00  7.80 3.51 1.27 6.47 
$7.50  3.26 3.26 1.48 6.52 
$8.00  2.82 2.82 1.52 5.64 
 
 Looking at the loss ratios across the different scenarios for smaller farms, it is 
clear the compromise achieved in the Farm Bill negotiations resulted in a similar 
premium structure for margin coverage thresholds of $6.50 and below. After moving 
above this level, however, differences in premium structures result in very different 
expected government loss ratios. At margin levels above $7.00, the 2014 Farm Bill is 
expected to results in government loss ratios much higher than under DFA or DSA 
with constant volatility. This is represented graphically in Figure 8.  
 Likewise, the same analysis may be conducted for large farms, or those 
producers with an annual production base of greater than 4,000,000 pounds of milk. 
Again, government loss ratios are compiled for each of the four scenarios and 
summarized in Table 45 below.  
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Table 45. Expected Government Loss Ratios, Large Farms 
  
Coverage 
Threshold  DFA 
DSA, constant 
volatility DSA 
2014 Farm 
Bill 
$4.00  5.36 - - - 
$4.50  5.20 0.47 11.71 11.71 
$5.00  5.14 0.62 8.47 8.47 
$5.50  4.45 0.60 4.89 4.89 
$6.00  3.79 0.89 4.67 4.52 
$6.50  3.43 0.94 3.43 3.43 
$7.00  3.69 0.81 2.23 1.69 
$7.50  2.36 1.07 2.36 1.84 
$8.00  2.53 1.36 2.53 1.97 
 
 When comparing government loss ratios at low margin thresholds, there is a 
clear difference between those found in DFA and those found in both the DSA and 
2014 Farm Bill. Unsurprisingly, states dominated by larger farms tended to favor the 
DSA during Farm Bill negotiations. At margins above $6.50, however, negotiations 
resulted in a compromise that left the 2014 Farm Bill premiums for insuring margins 
above this level less favorable than those contained in the original language of both 
DFA and DSA. An illustration of this phenomenon is contained in Figure 9.  
It is important to keep in mind that although government loss ratios are 
reduced in the case of both small and large farms with the introduction and 
implementation of supply controls, these savings are not without cost. Although the 
DMSP has the capability to reduce government payments in the form of indemnities, it 
simply shift the costs and burden directly to consumers and the economy at large in 
terms of higher milk prices and deadweight loss—over $140 million per month in net 
welfare alone. Despite the fact that supply controls have the capability of saving the 
 98 
government outlays in terms of indemnity payments, these savings come at the 
expense of consumers and the efficiency of the economy at large. Rather than rely on 
artificial market-distorting mechanisms such as supply controls to influence the cost of 
the margin insurance program, allowing the premium rates to fluctuate and reflect 
actual market conditions would allow for less adverse selection into the program and 
lower government loss ratios.  
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Figure 8. Expected Annual Government Loss Ratios, Small Farms 
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Figure 9. Expected Annual Government Loss Ratios, Large Farms
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis analyzed the margin insurance products debated throughout the 
course of the 2014 Farm Bill negotiations and the efficacy of supply controls in 
reducing costs of such a program. A new approach to modeling the milk market was 
developed in order to model state level milk supply and demand and to account for 
spatial dependencies. An instrumental variables approach is also employed to account 
for simultaneity of price and quantity determination in supply and demand systems. 
This type of modeling structure is necessary to examine the margin insurance 
programs and will be useful in future research for evaluating regional winners and 
losers. Results indicate that although supply controls could reduce indemnities paid by 
the government, they result in a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers, with 
significant deadweight loss occurring as a result of this transfer. This deadweight loss 
could cost up to hundreds of millions of dollars monthly.   
 This work provided unique extensions to the modeling of the market for U.S. 
milk. Previous studies not only tend to focus on modeling from a national and annual 
perspective, but they suffer from biased and inconsistent estimates because they ignore 
simultaneity of price and quantity as well as spatial dependencies. After a cursory look 
at the U.S. dairy industry and the programs debated leading up to the passage of the 
2014 Farm Bill, the data utilized is briefly described and analyzed. A number of 
approaches were taken to accurately model the supply and demand system, and a 
spatial system was developed with the hope it is utilized in future studies on 
implications of dairy markets and policy in the future.  
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 Coupled with the supply and demand models, a unique approach was taken to 
simulate future states of the world utilizing the estimated models, but taking into 
account volatilities and expectations inherit in the marketplace. By properly 
calibrating this system to forward looking futures and options data, the method is more 
in line with appropriate actuarial approaches than ad hoc historical pricing that is 
currently used by codifying premium rates into legislation. The dependencies inherit 
in the futures price and spot price complexes allow simulation of state level cash 
prices which aggregate to national level totals for use in this policy analysis, as these 
program payments rely on national input and output prices. This method of simulating 
spatial supply and demand systems while maintaining proper volatilities and 
correlations among the moving parts may be applied to a wide variety of economic 
modeling applications in dairy markets.  
 A baseline scenario was simulated in which there were no supply controls, but 
rather allowed for the market to adjust itself. Under this policy, consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, producer revenue, as well as state and national prices and quantities 
were obtained. After, the DMSP supply controls were layered on top of the simulation 
to shock production if national level margins fell below threshold levels as outlined in 
the DSA. The same variables were collected and analyzed with the assumption that 
100% of the milk produced in the U.S. over the four year simulation period were 
participating in the DMSP. As a result, deadweight loss per month and the size of the 
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers was able to be computed, as well as 
state level increases in price or decreases in quantity. For robustness purposes, these 
values were also collected at both the 10th and 90th percentiles. Finally, expected 
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indemnities and government loss ratios were computed for the DFA, DSA under 
constant volatility, DSA with DMSP, and the 2014 Farm Bill Dairy Title.  
 It is clear that supply controls would have a non-trivial effect on dairy markets 
and entail expected costs to the tune of potentially hundreds of millions of dollars per 
month, amounting to several billion dollars in deadweight loss over the course of the 
Farm Bill period. Despite only raising milk prices by an average of $0.70 per month 
over the course of four years, when spread across a sector of the economy as large as 
the U.S. dairy industry, the effects are large and costly. Much like Bastiat’s parable of 
the broken window, the unintended consequences of reducing government outlays 
affects economic activity in a way that is unseen, but ultimately is a net loss to society, 
namely through the loss in economic surplus and economic efficiency. These losses 
and shifts of welfare can be very large and damaging to the dairy market and 
consumers alike, and shifting costs from the government to consumers should not be a 
goal of a farm safety net programs; rather, providing some level of certainty and 
downside risk reduction should be the purpose of such programs. Savings would be 
better and more efficiently achieved by re-rating the premiums paid by producers to 
reflect actual market conditions, risks, and expectations in order to target budgeted 
government costs, as opposed to utilizing static premiums under supply controls.  
 Because this study presents unique and novel approaches to modeling the milk 
supply and demand system, particularly in terms of the level to which it is 
disaggregated, it allows for numerous research opportunities going forward. In 
particular, the ability to finally examine state level prices and quantities that aggregate 
up to a national model is of particular interest for researchers, policymakers, and 
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commodity groups alike. Because instruments are never perfect, further research into 
stronger instruments, or supply and demand shifters, could be an interesting step 
foward.  
Although the supply controls were not ultimately included in the 2014 Farm 
Bill, the idea of including supply controls in future pieces of dairy legislation is very 
likely to come up again if history is any guide. The models developed in this research 
may be utilized to examine specific participation levels in various supply control 
programs, particularly in the event certain regions are more likely to participate in 
such programs, and the flow of wealth from one region to the other could be computed 
and analyzed. The transfers of wealth from regions with low participation in programs 
containing supply controls toward regions with high participation is a logical next step 
with this research, as these transfers could be very large.  
The model may be utilized to assist producers in making annual participation 
decisions in the DPMPP, as far as when to participate and at what coverage levels and 
percentages he or she should select. Because of the disaggregation of the models, it 
could be possible to give a producer a better idea of his or her own basis risk and 
expected indemnities compared to those models which simply rely on national level 
input and output prices. The methods utilized in this study are not only restricted to the 
milk markets, but could be extended to other supply and demand systems in which 
spatial dependencies exist.  
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